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Completing the Energy Innovation Cycle:
The View from the Public Utility Commission
Jonas J. Monast* and Sarah K. Adair**
Achieving widespread adoption of innovative electricity generation technologies involves
a complex system of research, development, demonstration, and deployment, with each
phase then informing future developments. Despite a number of non-regulatory
programs at the federal level to support this process, the innovation premium—the
increased cost and technology risk often associated with innovative generation
technologies—creates hurdles in the state public utility commission (“PUC”) process.
These state level regulatory hurdles have the potential to frustrate federal energy goals and
prevent the learning process that is a critical component to technology innovation. This
Article explores how and why innovative energy technologies face challenges in the PUC
process, focusing on case studies where PUCs have approved or denied utility proposals
to deploy high cost, first-generation energy technologies. This Article concludes with an
outline of possible strategies to address PUC concerns by allocating the innovation
premium beyond a single utility’s ratepayers.

* Climate & Energy Program Director, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions at
Duke University; Senior Lecturing Fellow at Duke University. J.D., Georgetown University Law
Center (2002); B.A., Appalachian State University.
** Policy Associate, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions at Duke University.
M.E.M., Duke University (2011); B.A., Northwestern University.
This Article expands upon the white paper co-authored with David Hoppock and Dalia Patino
Echeverri. See generally Sarah K. Adair et al., Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Pol’y Solutions, The
State Role in Technology Innovation (2013), available at http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/
default/files/publications/ni_wp_13-01.pdf.
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Introduction
The federal government has long supported development and
1
deployment of innovative, cost-effective energy technologies. After World
War II, for example, the application of atomic energy research and
development to support peacetime economic growth aided the
2
commercialization of nuclear power. Following the energy crisis of the
1970s, the federal government expanded its focus beyond fossil fuels and
3
atomic energy to include renewable and energy efficiency technologies.
Interest in technology innovation has increased in recent years, as
lawmakers and stakeholders focus on the challenge of mitigating climate
change and other environmental impacts of the electric power sector.
Innovative energy technologies also offer the promise of additional
benefits, including employment for technology developers and installers,
reduced costs for consumers, improved electricity reliability, and energy
security.
While scholars and policymakers have paid considerable attention
to the role of the federal government in fostering innovation in electricity
4
generation technologies, there has been far less focus on the important
1. See generally Fred Sissine, Cong. Research Serv., RS22858, Renewable Energy R&D
Funding History: A Comparison with Funding For Nuclear Energy, Fossil Energy, and Energy
Efficiency R&D (2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., A.D. Sagar & J.P. Holdren, Assessing the Global Energy Innovation System: Some
Key Issues, 30 Energy Pol’y 465, 465–66 (2002); Varun Rai et al., Carbon Capture and Storage at
Scale: Lessons from the Growth of Analogous Energy Technologies, 38 Energy Pol’y 4089 (2010). See
generally Peter Folger, Cong. Research Serv., R42496, Carbon Capture and Sequestration:
Research, Development, and Demonstration at the U.S. Department of Energy (2013);
Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture & Storage, U.S. Dep’t of Energy & Envtl. Prot.

1348

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:1345

role of state utility regulators in ensuring that the technologies reach the
5
marketplace. Nascent electricity generation technologies are often more
expensive than conventional options and may also present significant
technology risks. These higher costs and increased risks can create
hurdles in the state public utility commission (“PUC”) process, as
commissioners compare proposals for installing new technologies against
the costs and risks associated with conventional options. These hurdles
can exist even when the federal government provides a sizable level of
funding to support a project, highlighting the need to better understand
the intersection of federal technology development goals and the state
6
regulatory process.
This Article first explores how and why innovative energy
technologies face hurdles in the PUC process. It then outlines strategies
for achieving technology deployment that avoid placing the cost and risk
of that deployment on a single utility’s ratepayers. Parts I through IV
characterize the challenge that innovative electricity generation
technologies present to state utility regulators. Part I provides an overview
of innovation in the electric power sector. Part II discusses federalism in
the energy innovation context, where the federal government pursues
technology development through a number of non-regulatory strategies
such as funding and incentives, while state PUCs play a direct regulatory
role by approving or denying utilities’ decisions to adopt the technologies.
Part III describes the state utility regulation process and explains the
challenges facing innovative technology deployment. Part IV explores
case studies where PUCs have considered utility proposals to construct
facilities with expensive, first generation technologies. Finally, Part V
introduces possible strategies to accelerate innovation within the electricity
sector and more equitably allocate the “innovation premium”—the added
cost and risk that implementation of novel technology inherently presents.

I. Innovation in the Electric Power Sector
Energy technology innovation is a broad concept, covering changes
that (1) reduce the monetary cost of a given energy service, (2) increase
the quality of the energy service for a given cost, or (3) reduce the
environmental or political impacts of a given energy service at a cost that

Agency, Executive Summary: Report of the Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and
Storage (2010) [hereinafter Carbon Capture and Storage]; Richard G. Newell, Literature Review of
Recent Trends and Future Prospects for Innovation in Climate Change Mitigation (OECD
Environment Working Paper, No. 9, 2009), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/218688342302.
5. A few authors have discussed the important role of state utility regulators. See generally Ken
Costello, Nat’l Reg. Research Inst., New Technologies: Challenges for State Utility
Regulators and What They Should Ask (2012); Scott Hempling, Joint Demonstration Projects:
Options for Regulatory Treatment, 21 Electricity J. 30, 30 (2008).
6. See infra Part IV.A.2–3.
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7

is considered worthwhile. There are numerous examples of innovation
throughout the electricity generation system, from fuel extraction to
electricity generation, transmission, and end use. For example, the
combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing to access
shale gas resources has resulted in a dramatic increase in the domestic
supply of natural gas, causing prices to drop and many electric utilities to
undergo a rapid transformation to increase natural gas-fired generation
8
in their portfolios. Innovations in electricity generation include advances
in solar energy technologies, offshore wind, coal-fired electricity
generation facilities with carbon capture and storage (“CCS”), and
9
improved efficiencies with new natural gas turbines. Advances in smart
grid technologies are resulting in innovations in the delivery of electricity
that allow grid operators to manage grid stability and better incorporate
10
renewable energy and energy efficiency. Smart grid technology
advancement is also facilitating demand side management to help reduce
11
consumer demand and shift load from peak to off-peak times.
Improvements in appliance efficiency are also reducing electricity
demand, regardless of whether these appliances are part of an integrated
12
smart grid system. Each of these advances can contribute to a reliable
electricity system that minimizes environmental impacts in a costeffective manner.
Innovations in business practices are also affecting demand for new
technologies for the electricity sector. In states with restructured
electricity markets, for example, two major grid operators—the New
England Independent System Operator (“ISO-NE”) and the PJM
Interconnection Regional Transmission Organization—conduct auctionbased forward capacity markets, allowing “a wide range of demand-side
resources to compete with supply-side resources in meeting the resource
13
adequacy requirements of the region.” Resources eligible to bid in the
7. Kelly Sims Gallagher et al., Energy-Technology Innovation, 31 Ann. Rev. Envtl. Resources
193, 195 (2006).
8. Lincoln Pratson et al., Fuel Prices, Emission Standards and Generation Costs for Coal Versus
Natural Gas Power Plants, 47 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 4926, 4926 (2013).
9. See Carin Hall, GE's Innovative Natural Gas Turbines See Global Popularity, Energy Digital
(Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.energydigital.com/oil_gas/ges-innovative-natural-gas-turbines-see-globalpopularity; DOE-Sponsored Research Improves Gas Turbine Performance, Dep't of Energy, Office of
Fossil Energy (June 17, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://energy.gov/fe/articles/doe-sponsored-researchimproves-gas-turbine-performance; Press Release, The Shaw Group, Inc., Shaw and Exelon Join NET
Power to Develop Next-Generation Power Technology (June 6, 2012), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/06/idUS99091+06-Jun-2012+BW20120606.
10. Int’l Energy Agency, Technology Roadmap: Smart Grids 1, 6 (2011).
11. Id. at 5, 24.
12. See Steve Pacala & Robert Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for
the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 13 Science 968, 970 (2004).
13. Meg Gottstein & Lisa Schwartz, The Role of Forward Capacity Markets in Increasing
Demand-Side and Other Low-Carbon Resources: Experience and Prospects, Reg. Assistance
Project 3 (2010).
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ISO-NE market include: “traditional power generation; intermittent
generation resources such as wind, solar, and hydro; imports of capacity
from outside New England; and demand resources, including real-time
demand response, load management, distributed generation, and energy
14
efficiency.”
State policies such as renewable energy mandates, energy efficiency
mandates, and cap-and-trade systems—all relatively recent policy
developments—can create demand for new energy technologies. Each of
these examples can provide market incentives for companies to develop
and deploy new energy technologies that achieve the government
mandates in a cost-effective manner and meet the demand for reliable
15
electricity. For example, the North Carolina renewable energy portfolio
16
standard requires 0.2% of generation from swine waste by 2020. This
mandate has created an opportunity to test and improve biogas-toenergy technology and achieve economies of scale such as by centralizing
17
energy production from neighboring farms. As of early 2014, twentynine states have implemented renewable portfolio standards and twenty
have implemented energy efficiency portfolio standards—legislative
mandates requiring that the electricity mix include a specified percentage
of renewable energy, or that utilities invest a certain amount in energy
18
efficiency measures to reduce overall demand. Other states have
19
identified renewable energy and energy efficiency goals and objectives.
Ten states have implemented cap-and-trade systems that require
electricity generation facilities to purchase a state-issued allowance for
each ton of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emitted into the atmosphere and
surrender those allowances to specified government regulators at the end
of a compliance period. Nine of those states—located in the Northeast
and Midwest—are participating in a regional market known as the

14. Cheryl Jenkins et al., Energy Efficiency as a Resource in the ISO New England Forward
Capacity Market, 4 Energy Efficiency 31, 34 (2011).
15. The effectiveness of the incentive depends on numerous factors, including, inter alia, levels of
stringency, electricity demand, and technology costs. See generally Caroline Fischer & Louis Preonas,
Combining Policies for Renewable Energy: Is the Whole Less than the Sum of its Parts?, 4 Int’l Rev.
Envtl.
&
Resource
Econ.,
2010,
available
at
http://www.rff.org/Documents/
Fischer_Preonas_IRERE_2010.pdf.
16. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-133.8(e) (2009).
17. Darmawon Prasojdo et al., Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Pol’y Solutions, A SpatialEconomic Optimization Study of Swine Waste-Derived Biogas Infrastructure Design in North
Carolina 4 (2013).
18. See Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DSIRE: Database of State Incentives for
Renewables & Efficiency [DSIRE] (Mar. 2013), http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/
RPS_map.pdf; Energy Efficiency Resource Standards, DSIRE (Feb. 2013), http://www.dsireusa.org/
documents/summarymaps/EERS_map.pdf.
19. See Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DSIRE (Mar. 2013), http://www.dsireusa.org/
documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf.
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20

Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. California has implemented its own
cap-and-trade system, and has formally signed an agreement to link its
21
system with Quebec. California officials have also indicated a willingness
22
to explore additional linkages. The impacts of these programs vary
depending on the stringency of the mandate, the time horizon of the
policy, and political dynamics that may affect policy certainty.
This Article explores the critical, and often overlooked, role of state
public utility commissions in determining whether innovative electricity
generation technologies reach the marketplace. State PUCs regulate
monopoly providers of electricity, a service “affected with a public
23
interest” to protect the common good by ensuring new infrastructure
24
and by
investments satisfy public convenience and necessity,
25
establishing just and reasonable rates. Thus, the viability of a utilityscale demonstration project often depends on commission approval. As
the case studies presented in Part IV of this Article demonstrate, utility
commissions may facilitate or frustrate utility plans to implement
innovative technologies, including pre-commercial demonstration
projects and utility-scale projects relying on early generation
26
technologies—both critical aspects of the technology innovation cycle.
“Innovation . . . is not complete unless it includes the further steps
through which the new technologies or improvements attain widespread
27
application.”

20. These states include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See RGGI, Inc., Reg’l Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/rggi (last visited June 1, 2014).
21. See Linkage, Cal. Envtl. Prots. Agency Air Resources Bd., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/
capandtrade/linkage/linkage.htm (last visited June 1, 2014).
22. See Mary Nichols, California’s Cap-and-Trade Program Has Learned From Europe, Energy
Biz (July 16, 2013), http://www.energybiz.com/article/13/07/californias-cap-and-trade-program-haslearned-europe (“Because of the way our linkage process works, any future partners will have that
same ability to build a program that keeps central focus on those reductions and their needs but built
around a shared platform that tracks allowances and offsets.”).
23. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876) (“Property does become clothed with a public
interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large.
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants
to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good,
to the extent of the interest he has thus created.” (emphasis added)).
24. See William K. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity:
Developments in the States 1870–1920, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 426, 427 (1979).
25. See Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 690
(1923) (“Rates which are not sufficient to yield a reasonable return on the value of the property used at the
time it is being used to render the service are unjust, unreasonable, and confiscatory, and their enforcement
deprives the public utility company of its property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
26. Energy technology innovation includes when technologies “are conceived; studied; built,
demonstrated, and refined in environments from the laboratory to the commercial marketplace; and
propagated into widespread use.” Gallagher et al., supra note 7, at 195.
27. Id.
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II. Federalism and the Innovation Process: The Intersection of
Regulatory and Non-Regulatory Strategies
Technology innovation is a multistage process, often summarized
into four general phases: research, development, demonstration, and
28
deployment. Rather than a linear process, progressing chronologically
from one phase to the next, recent innovation policy scholarship points
out that moving energy technologies through the innovation system
depends on an iterative cycle of learning and feedback, with knowledge
gained during each phase informing subsequent research, development,
29
demonstration, and deployment efforts.
Experience in the electricity sector and across other areas of the
economy suggests the cost of relatively new technologies will decrease as
industry accumulates experience with design, construction, and
30
operation. A combination of learning-by-researching, learning-by-doing
(for producers), and learning-by-using (for customers) contributes to
31
reduced costs and enhanced performance over time. For example, the
investment costs for flue gas desulfurization technologies, which employ
similar principles of operation to CCS, “declined by 13% for each
32
doubling of capacity worldwide.” Empirical studies have similarly
identified a ten-to-thirty percent decline in cost with each doubling of
33
production across a wide range of technologies. Learning and
economies of scale allow technologies that successfully diffuse in markets
to reach acceptable levels of cost and risk.
Successfully stewarding an energy-technology concept through these
phases and achieving wide-scale deployment involves numerous public
28. President’s Comm. of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., Exec. Office of the President, Powerful
Partnerships: The Federal Role in International Cooperation on Energy Innovation 1–2 (1999)
(defining the energy innovation process as “energy research, development, demonstration, and
deployment”). It is possible to identify additional phases necessary for innovation. For example, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) characterizes this process as a “research and
development continuum” and identifies six stages: (1) research or proof of concept, (2) development,
(3) demonstration, (4) verification, (5) commercialization, and (6) diffusion and utilization. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, Environmental Technology Opportunities Portal: Research and Development
Continuum (July 12, 2012), http://epa.gov/environmentaltechnology/continuum.html.
29. Kelly Sims Gallagher et al., The Energy Technology Innovation System, 37 Ann. Rev. Envtl.
Resources 137, 140 (2012). In addition, Gallagher and her colleagues replace the deployment phase
with “market formation and diffusion.” Id.
30. Tooraj Jamasb, Technical Change Theory and Learning Curves: Patterns of Progress in
Electricity Generation Technologies, 28 Energy J. 51, 64–66 (2007).
31. See, e.g., Sonia Yeh & Edward S. Rubin, A Centurial History of Technological Change and
Learning Curves for Pulverized Coal-Fired Utility Boilers, 32 Energy 1996, 1996–97 (2007) (describing the
role of learning-by-doing, research and development, and other factors on cost trends); see also Paul L.
Joskow & George A. Rozanski, The Effects of Learning by Doing on Nuclear Plant Operating Reliability,
61 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 161, 161 (1979) (arguing that increases over time in capacity factors of nuclear
power plants in the United States and around the world are attributable to learning-by-doing).
32. Keywan Riahi et al., Technological Learning for Carbon Capture and Sequestration
Technologies, 26 Energy Econ. 539, 561 (2004).
33. David Popp, Innovation and Climate Policy, 2 Ann. Rev. Resource Econ. 275, 283 (2010).
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and private actors, including a range of regulatory entities at various
levels of government (federal, regional, state, and local) and among
entities located on the same governmental plane—such as state
environmental regulators, state energy offices, and public utility
commissions at the state level; and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental
34
Protection Agency at the federal level. Much recent scholarship
35
examines various approaches to federalism in the energy sector. The
range of energy federalism inquiries typically center on questions of
36
jurisdiction, exploring the regulatory roles for different levels of
37
government, whether lawmakers and judges have drawn or interpreted
38
those lines correctly, and suggesting alternative approaches to better
39
achieve a desired policy outcome. For example, smart grid technologies
and expansion of the electricity grid may raise questions about the
interaction between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
40
(“FERC”) and state utility commissions. Similarly, transportation and
storage of CO2 emissions captured from power plants may require
interactions between the FERC, the U.S. Department of Transportation,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), state environmental
regulators, state pipeline regulators, and local and state regulators
41
overseeing protection of mineral rights.
Energy technology innovation requires viewing federalism through
a different lens, one that recognizes the intersection of regulatory and
non-regulatory policy approaches implemented at different levels of
42
government. While Congress and the federal agencies may foster
34. See generally Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 Md. L.
Rev. 773 (2013).
35. See, e.g., Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C.
L. Rev. 1283 (2013); Robin Kundis Craig, Hydraulic Fracturing (Fracking), Federalism, and the WaterEnergy Nexus, 49 Idaho L. Rev. 241 (2013); David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the
Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 431, 460 (2013); Daniel K. Lee & Timothy
P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support
State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 Envtl. L. 295 (2013); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J.
Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 Vand.
L. Rev. 1801 (2012).
36. See, e.g., Symposium, Transcript of the Federalist Society’s 2012 National Lawyers Convention:
Environmental Law Federalism, and the Energy Revolution: Can State and Federal Regulators Adapt to
Innovations?, 14 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 575 (2013).
37. See, e.g., Klass & Wilson, supra note 35.
38. See, e.g., Lee & Duane, supra note 35.
39. See, e.g., Spence, supra note 35.
40. See generally Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2013); Klass & Wilson, supra note 35.
41. See generally Jonas J. Monast et al., A Cooperative Federalism Framework for CCS
Regulation, 7 Envtl. & Energy L. & Pol’y J. 1 (2012).
42. The concept of “dynamic” federalism provides a useful framework for evaluating “vertical”
interactions across multiple levels of government, as well as “horizontal” interactions among
regulatory bodies within the same level of government. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 34. Jody
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development and deployment of new technologies through pollution
43
reduction mandates, the primary mechanisms for achieving deployment
of innovative energy technologies under current federal law involve a
range of private sector incentives, government research programs, and
44
research grants to universities. These federal incentives and research
funding opportunities are aspirational, as they aim to reduce the costs of
energy technologies but rely on the private sector to adopt them rather
than create specific compliance obligations to ensure technology
adoption. They do not, therefore, raise the types of jurisdictional issues
that are the focus of typical energy federalism inquiries.
From a constitutional perspective, there is little doubt that the
federal government could justify a more direct regulatory role in
deploying electricity generation technologies under the Commerce
Clause. The electricity grid is regional in nature and electricity produced
45
in one state is regularly consumed in another state. In fact, the federal
government already has a direct regulatory role in many aspects of the
electricity sector. For example, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
of 1978 required electric utilities to purchase electricity from qualifying
non-utility generators—including renewable and cogeneration facilities
of eighty megawatts (“MW”) or less—at their avoided cost of
46
generation. Later, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 called for an electric
reliability organization to develop and enforce reliability standards for the
U.S. electricity grid—a role served by the self-regulatory organization
47
North American Electric Reliability Corporation. The EPA—which
regulates numerous aspects of power plant operations that affect air
quality, water quality, and hazardous waste—has promulgated a number
Freeman proposes another framework—“network federalism”—that similarly offers a constructive
approach to exploring energy innovation federalism. See Jody Freeman, Network Federalism (Nov. 18,
2013)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2356380 (“The network analogy best captures three features of how certain
contemporary governance systems actually work: authority is divided among different levels of
government, dispersed across institutions at the same level of government, and shared among both
public and private actors.”).
43. These mandates may come in the form of specific technology mandates—e.g., requiring
installation of Best Available Control Technology—or through market mechanisms requiring regional
reductions in pollution but allowing flexibility regarding the location of the pollution reductions—e.g.,
Acid Rain Trading Program and scrubbers.
44. See, e.g., Science and Innovation, U.S. Dep’t Energy, http://energy.gov/science-innovation
(last visited June 1, 2014).
45. The continental United States electricity grid consists of three large regions: the Eastern
Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas. See
NERC Interconnections, Nat’l Elec. Reliability Council, http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/
keyplayers/Documents/NERC_Interconnections_Color_072512.jpg (last visited June 1, 2014). Within
the Eastern and Western Interconnections, there are also a number of regional electric power markets.
See Electric Power Markets: National Overview, Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n (Feb. 4, 2014),
http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/overview.asp.
46. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2012).
47. Id. § 824a-2.
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of rules affecting the power sector, and is considering additional
48
49
regulations governing coal ash and CO2. In April 2013, the EPA
announced a New Source Performance Standard that, if enacted as
proposed, will require any new coal-fired power plant to install carbon
50
capture technologies. Congress has also considered legislative proposals
51
to create a nationwide cap-and-trade system for CO2 emissions and a
52
federal renewable portfolio standard, with the goal of stimulating
53
development and adoption of new energy technologies.
Nonetheless, Congress and federal agencies have consistently upheld
the traditional role of the states in governing intrastate electricity
54
55
generation and transmission and rates charged to consumers. As long as
policymakers maintain the current framework, it is important to
recognize the relationship between non-regulatory programs to develop
energy technologies and the direct role of PUCs in influencing whether
electric utilities deploy the technologies. This Article contributes to the
understanding of energy innovation federalism by exploring the role of
PUCs in the innovation process and offers a framework for addressing
barriers that may frustrate commercialization of promising energy
technologies.
A. Federal Efforts to Foster Energy Innovation
Federal investment in innovative electricity generation technology
dates to the late 1940s, when President Eisenhower embarked on a
56
landmark effort to commercialize nuclear energy. In response to the
energy crises of the 1970s, efforts to accelerate energy technology
innovation expanded to include renewable and advanced fossil fuel
57
technologies. Current U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) programs
48. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Special
Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128 (June 21,
2010)
(to
be
codified
at
40 C.F.R.
pts.
257,
261,
264,
265,
268,
271, 302).
49. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (Apr. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., America Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009);
America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007).
52. See, e.g., American Renewable Energy and Efficiency Act, H.R. 5967, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2012).
53. See, e.g., S. 1567, 110th Cong. § 1(a) (2007) (establishing preference in allocating funds under
the program to “state programs to stimulate or enhance innovative renewable energy technologies”).
54. See Jones, supra note 24.
55. Gary D. Allison, Judging the Prudence of Constructing Nuclear Power Plants: A Report to the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 15 Tulsa L.J. 262, 264 (1979) (observing that PUCs can
influence nuclear power plant development through their authority to protect consumers from bearing
the cost of imprudent investments).
56. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Direct Federal Financial Interventions and
Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2010, at 33 (2011).
57. See Sissine, supra note 1, at 2.
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58

seek to reduce the cost of carbon capture, enable the grid to handle
59
more intermittent renewable electricity, and develop and deploy
60
offshore wind technology in the United States. Each of these programs
61
aims to reduce cost to improve competitiveness and increase adoption.
The DOE implements research, development, and deployment
(“RD&D”) programs through a host of research grants and private
sector incentives including grants and loan guarantees. The DOE’s
Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (“ARPA-E”) provides
funding and technical assistance to companies seeking to commercialize
62
“transformational” energy technologies. The Loan Programs Office
offers loan guarantees to reduce investment risk for companies
63
developing or installing certain categories of new technologies. These
non-regulatory efforts may run headlong into the PUC process
especially, although not exclusively, in states that maintain the traditional
“cost of service” regulatory model that seeks to protect consumers from
64
the monopoly power of vertically-integrated electric utilities.
B. The PUC Role in Energy Innovation
A public utility is a private business that provides a public service,
such as the production and distribution of electricity, and is subject to
public restraints on its commercial activities, such as the production and
65
distribution of electric power. The “regulatory compact” established
between the public utility and the state grants the utility an exclusive
service territory, and in exchange, obligates the company to provide
66
adequate service at reasonable rates to all consumers within its territory.

58. See Carbon Capture R&D, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, http://energy.gov/fe/scienceinnovation/carbon-capture-and-storage-research/carbon-capture-rd (last visited June 1, 2014).
59. See SunShot Initiative High Penetration Solar Portal: Power Electronics, U.S. Dep’t Energy,
https://solarhighpen.energy.gov/topics/system_technologies/power_electronics (last visited June 1, 2014).
60. See Offshore Wind Research and Development, U.S. Dep’t of Energy,
http://energy.gov/eere/wind/offshore-wind-research-and-development (last visited June 1, 2014)
[hereinafter U.S. DOE, Offshore Wind].
61. See Carbon Capture R&D, supra note 58 (stating the program goal of achieving costs below
$40 per ton for second generation technology and below $10 per ton for transformational technology);
SunShot Initiative, supra note 59 (describing the goal to make solar cost-competitive by the end of the
decade); Offshore Wind, supra note 60 (describing the program’s goal to “overcome key barriers to
wind development, including the relatively high cost of energy”).
62. Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy: About, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, http://arpae.energy.gov/?q=arpa-e-site-page/about (last visited June 1, 2014).
63. Loan Programs Office: Our Mission, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, http://lpo.energy.gov/about/ourmission (last visited June 1, 2014).
64. See infra Part III.B.
65. See Jones, supra note 24, at 426.
66. See, e.g., Raymond Jackson, Regulation and Electric Utility Rate Levels, 45 Land Econ. 372,
373 (1969).
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67

Under this system, also known as cost of service regulation, utilities may
recover all “prudent” costs and a reasonable rate of return on invested
capital from ratepayers within a utility’s service area subject to
68
commission approval. Rates must be “just and reasonable,” and not
confiscatory, which requires PUCs to balance consumer protection goals
and the utility’s right to the opportunity to earn a fair return on its
69
investment.
In states that retain a traditional model of electricity regulation,
state PUCs oversee the activities of vertically integrated utilities
70
regarding electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. New
generation facilities typically require a Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity (“CPCN”), wherein the PUC must determine that there is
a need for the additional capacity and construction of the proposed
71
facility satisfies the public interest. Additionally, PUCs set utility rates
to allow a reasonable return on prudently invested capital, which
discourages utilities from incurring expenses that are likely to be found
72
imprudent and unrecoverable.
In restructured states, lawmakers have replaced traditional regulation
of vertically integrated electric utilities with wholesale markets for
electricity generation in which electricity generators sell power
73
competitively. In these states, regulators oversee electric distribution
companies, including investments in new distribution technology, such as
74
smart grid. The challenge of implementing innovative generation
technologies in restructured states is primarily driven by market forces.
Merchant developers may be unable to recoup the high costs of
innovative technologies by selling into wholesale markets where they
face competition from generators using conventional technologies. In
practice, early applications of generation technologies in restructured
67. See, e.g., Karl McDermott, Edison Elec. Inst., Cost of Service Regulation in the
Investor-Owned Electric Utility Industry: A History of Adaptation (June 2012).
68. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 66; see also Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States,
304 U.S. 470, 475 (1938) (defining the fair value of utility assets for ratemaking purposes as based on
whether the assets are used and useful); Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
Mo., 262 U.S. 276, 289 n.1 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (explaining the prudence standard excludes
from rate base dishonest or obviously wasteful or imprudent expenditures).
69. See Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S.
679, 690 (1923).
70. Paul L. Joskow, Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity
Sector, 11 J. Econ. Persp. 119, 121 (1997).
71. See generally Jones, supra note 24, at 427.
72. Richard D. Gary & Edgar M. Roach, Jr., The Proper Regulatory Treatment of Investment in
Cancelled Utility Plants, 13 Hofstra L. Rev. 469, 470–71 (1985) (citing W. Ohio Gas Co. v. Pub. Util.
Comm’n, 294 U.S. 63, 72 (1935)).
73. Peter Fox-Penner & Heidi Bishop, Mission, Structure, and Governance in Future Electric
Markets: Some Observations, 89 Or. L. Rev. 1107, 1108 (2011).
74. See id. at 1110; see also Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., Order No. 83410, Case No. 9208, Balt.
Gas & Elec. Co. (June 21, 2010) (order).
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states often require long-term power purchase agreements for abovemarket energy prices between project developers and distribution
75
utilities—subject to PUC approval—in order to obtain financing. A
number of restructured states have enacted legislation that directs
distribution utilities to solicit proposals for renewable energy projects
76
and enter into power purchase agreements subject to PUC approval,
and utilities have brought proposals for innovative projects before state
77
regulators under these directives.
Demonstration and early deployment are both particularly important
elements of the innovation cycle described above, and progress at these
phases often requires approval by state PUCs. Demonstration projects
78
contribute to learning and technology development in a number of ways
and also assist in scaling up technology in cases where laboratory tests are
much smaller than potential real-world applications, such as for power
79
plants. For example, demonstration projects “generate information
about the design of components at commercial scale, process reliability
80
and risk of production failure.” Technical and economic performance
data can then inform additional research and development to refine
81
technology. Demonstration projects also produce information on
profitability of the technology and can reduce marketing hurdles by
demonstrating the feasibility of technology to potential buyers, which
82
enhances confidence and contributes to future market development.
Even after technology has been adequately demonstrated at scale,
barriers may continue to frustrate early deployment. For example, cost,
information, market organization, infrastructure, regulations, or slow
75. See, e.g., Mass. Dep’t Pub. Util., D.P.U. 10-54, 48–51, Mass. Elec. Co. & Nantucket Elec.
Co. (Nov. 22, 2010) (petition) (“The evidence demonstrates that a project like Cape Wind would face
difficulty attracting financing without a predictable source of revenues with a creditworthy entity . . . .
[T]he [power purchase agreement] will help overcome obstacles to Cape Wind obtaining financing.”).
76. See, e.g., Long Term Contracting Standard for Renewable Energy, R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-26.1
(2006); An Act To Implement the Recommendations of the Governor’s Ocean Energy Task Force,
Me. Pub. L. ch. 615 (2010); Green Communities Act, 2008 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 169, § 83 (West);
220 Mass. Code Regs. §§ 17.03(1)–(2) (2008).
77. See, e.g., R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4111, Review of Proposed Town of New
Shoreham Project (Apr. 2, 2010) (report and order); Mass. Dep’t Pub. Util., D.P.U. 10-54, 48–51,
Mass. Elec. Co. & Nantucket Elec. Co. (Nov. 22, 2010).
78. See generally Ambuj Sagar & Kelly Sims Gallagher, Energy Technology Demonstration &
Deployment (Belfer Ctr. for Sci. & Int’l Affairs, 2004), available at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/
publication/2596/energy_technology_demonstration_and_deployment.html.
79. See id.; see also Paul Harborne & Chris Hendry, Pathways to Commercial Wind Power in the
US, Europe and Japan: The Role of Demonstration Projects and Field Trials in the Innovation Process,
37 Energy Pol’y 3580, 3580 (2009) (describing how demonstration and field trials provided feedback
to basic research and development that helped Danish firms capture the market for wind turbines
which had been dominated by U.S. firms in the early 1980s).
80. Stephen R. Lefevre, Using Demonstration Projects to Advance Innovation in Energy, 44 Pub.
Admin. Rev. 483, 487 (1984).
81. See Sagar & Ghallager, supra note 78, at 3.
82. See Lefevre, supra note 80, at 487.
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83

capital stock turnover can hinder market diffusion. These factors are
persistent barriers to the commercialization of new electricity generation
technology because the electricity sector is characterized by slow capital
stock turnover and utility regulators seek the least-cost resources to meet
electricity demand.
In the energy sector, companies infrequently pursue demonstration
projects independently because long time horizons for investment
returns and high capital requirements make it difficult to monetize
benefits on an acceptable timeline for investors. Government-funded
demonstration programs, therefore, are designed to facilitate the
84
demonstration and early deployment of innovative energy technologies.
Because these demonstration programs frequently require participating
companies to take on a portion of the cost and risk, electricity generators
often must seek approval from a PUC. Commissioners must then assess
the additional costs and technology risks associated with the project to
ensure that cost recovery is consistent with state-level consumer protection
85
goals. If the costs and risks are deemed too high, the PUC may prohibit
a utility from passing project costs to ratepayers, thereby denying an
opportunity for the companies involved, or perhaps the electricity sector
as a whole, to learn from the project and improve upon the technologies.

III. State Regulatory Hurdles to Implementation of Innovative
Generation Technologies
PUCs can provide the certainty necessary to demonstrate and
deploy new technologies through approval of utility-owned projects,
long-term power purchase agreements, and inclusion of above-market
costs in electricity rates. PUC approval and cost recovery through rates
can remove investment risk for shareholders, effectively shifting the risk
to ratepayers. However, PUCs have historically emphasized cost
minimization, posing a challenge for large-scale demonstration projects,
which are characterized by high short-term costs and diffuse long-term
benefits. Furthermore, innovative generation technologies introduce
unique financial and technological risks that complicate the public
interest inquiry.
86
In accordance with the just and reasonable standard of ratemaking
87
and the broad public interest duties of PUCs, commissions have sought
the lowest possible cost of service for consumers within a set of
83. See Sagar & Ghallager, supra note 78, at 4–8.
84. See Harborne & Hendry, supra note 79, at 3585.
85. See infra Part III.
86. See Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 679, 683
(1923).
87. See Ford P. Hall, Certificates of Convenience and Necessity, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 107, 108 (1929)
(“Statutes of this kind have several purposes, but that most emphasized by courts and commissions is
the purpose of protecting the consuming public.”).
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constraints—such as reliability, financial health of the utility, and
88
renewable energy mandates. It is challenging for early applications of
innovative technologies to strictly meet the least cost standard, especially
in the current era of large capital investment needs, declining sales
89
growth, and the resulting upward pressure on electricity rates.
Early applications of new technology are generally expensive
relative to mature technologies that have benefited from learning and
90
economies of scale. For example, the U.S. Energy Information
Administration projects that the levelized cost of energy for advanced
coal with CCS is $70 per megawatt-hour (“MWh”) higher than for
natural gas combined cycle, as shown in Table 1, infra. Thus, it is difficult
for state utility regulators to approve implementation of new
technologies unless they believe the relative costs of various technology
options is likely to shift during the operational life of the new facility, for
91
example due to fuel price volatility or future environmental regulations.

88. See generally Shimon Awerbuch, Portfolio-Based Electricity Generation Planning: Policy
Implication for Renewables and Energy Security, 11 Mitigation & Adaptation Strategies for Global
Change 693 (2006) (“[L]east-cost planning has provided the basis for electricity generation capacity
expansion.”); see also Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 2009-00545, Ky. Power Co., at 5 (June 28, 2010)
(“The Commission has long recognized that ‘least cost’ is one of the fundamental principles used when
setting rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.”); Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. E-6472/M-051993, Excelsior Energy, Inc., at 7 (Aug. 30, 2007) (order resolving procedural issues) (noting the
administrative law judge finding that the proposed integrated gasification combined cycle (“IGCC”)
project is not a least cost resource and the Commission’s opinion that the cost is unreasonable).
89. See McDermott, supra note 67, at 41.
90. See, e.g., Daniel Cusick, Southern Co. Vows to Continue Miss. ‘Clean Coal’ Plant Despite
Mounting Losses, E&E Publ’g, LLC (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/
stories/1059985429.
91. See generally Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. E-6472/M-05-1993, Excelsior Energy,
Inc. (Aug. 30, 2007).
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Table 1: Estimated Levelized Cost of New 92Generation
Resources, 2018. (2011 $/MWh)
Plant type

Capacity
factor
(percent)

Levelized
capital
cost

Conventional Coal
Advanced
Coal
Advanced
Coal with
CCS

85

Fixed
O&M

Variable
O&M
(including
fuel)

Transmission
investment

Total
system
levelized
cost

Dispatchable Technologies
65.7
4.1
29.2

1.2

100.1

85

84.4

6.8

30.7

1.2

123.0

85

88.4

8.8

37.2

1.2

135.5

Conventional
Combined
Cycle
Advanced
Combined
Cycle
Advanced
CC with
CCS
Conventional
Combustion
Turbine
Advanced
Combustion
Turbine
Advanced
Nuclear
Geothermal
Biomass

87

15.8

1.7

48.4

1.2

67.1

87

17.4

2.0

45.0

1.2

65.6

87

34.0

4.1

54.1

1.2

93.4

30

44.2

2.7

80.0

3.4

130.3

30

30.4

2.6

68.2

3.4

104.6

90

83.4

11.6

12.3

1.1

108.4

92
83

76.2
53.2

12.0
14.3

0.0
42.3

1.4
1.2

89.6
111.0

Wind
WindOffshore
Solar PV
Solar
Thermal
Hydro

34
37

70.3
193.4

13.1
22.4

0.0
0.0

3.2
5.7

86.6
221.5

25
20

130.4
214.2

9.9
41.4

0.0
0.0

4.0
5.9

144.3
261.5

52

78.1

4.1

6.1

2.0

90.3

Natural Gas-fired

Non-Dispatchable Technologies

92. Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2013, U.S.
Energy Info. Admin. (Jan. 2013), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/electricity_generation.pdf.
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Unique risks associated with early applications of innovative
technologies further complicate the least cost inquiry. These include
financial risks, such as risk that a vendor will be unable to complete the
project, risk of cost overruns and unforeseen spikes in capital costs, and
93
technological risk. Due to the cost of large-scale electricity generation
facilities, a technology failure can undermine the financial viability of an
entire utility. For early technology applications, utilities may be unable to
obtain firm pricing from vendors without paying a premium on an
already expensive project, whereas it is difficult for a PUC to evaluate
and approve a project without assurance that the utility’s cost estimate is
94
credible. Duke Energy’s integrated gasification combined cycle
(“IGCC”) coal plant in Edwardsport, Indiana, provides a recent example
of the risk associated with new technologies. The plant went offline just
six days after Duke declared the plant operational as a result of damage
95
to fans required to operate the plant’s gasifiers. A Duke spokesperson
told the press, “that’s not unusual with any new plant, but it is more
common with advanced technology on this scale. We expect to deal with
96
technical issues early in operations.”
Beyond the level of financial and technological risk, the allocation
of risk between utility shareholders and ratepayers is an important
97
question for state regulators’ public interest inquiry. Risk may also be
allocated between two or more utility operating companies owned by the
same holding company, between two or more utilities that will co-own a
98
demonstration project, or between a utility and its vendors. If consumers
shoulder significant financial and technological risk, construction cost
overruns or underperformance have the potential to render a seemingly
cost-effective project very expensive for ratepayers.
The mechanism for cost recovery is an important factor in risk
allocation. Traditionally, utilities have recovered invested capital plus a

93. See generally Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n.
94. See, e.g., Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co., at 5–6
(Apr. 14, 2008) (final order) (likening project approval to allowing ratepayers to write a blank check); see also
Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. E-6472/M-05-1993, Excelsior Energy, Inc., at 15 (Aug. 30, 2007).
95. Update: Duke’s Edwardsport IGCC Plant Operating Intermittently, Power Engineering
(Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.power-eng.com/articles/2013/08/dukes-edwardsport-igcc-plant-operatingintermittently.html.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co., at 4 (Apr. 24,
2012) (final order on remand); see also Colo. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Decision No. C09-0472, Docket
No. 09A-15E, Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., at 6 (Apr. 27, 2009) (final order) (noting that commission staff
opposed the project, reasoning that it constituted research and development that is properly funded by
shareholders, and ratepayers should not be responsible for the project’s financial and operational risk).
98. See, e.g., Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUE-2009-00030, Appalachian Power Co., at
20–21 (July 15, 2009) (final order); Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. E-6472/M-05-1993,
Excelsior Energy, Inc., at 17 (Aug. 30, 2007).
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reasonable rate of return through periodic general rate cases. Under
this arrangement, utility rates are calculated based on used and useful
invested capital, meaning that construction costs are not recoverable
100
until the first rate case after a new unit is placed into service. Costs
allowable in rates are subject to retrospective prudence reviews, thereby
protecting ratepayers from imprudent management decisions and
101
allocating a portion of the risk of cost overruns to the utility.
In recent years, it has been increasingly difficult for utilities to
access capital for large generation projects with long construction
102
timelines. States and regulators have responded by allowing recovery
of costs incurred during construction in certain cases, sometimes as an
103
incentive to promote development of specific technologies. However,
relative to cost recovery through general rate cases, early recovery of
construction costs reduces the utility’s risk and increases risk for
104
ratepayers. For example, the Maryland Public Service Commission
(“PSC”) found that early recovery of advanced metering infrastructure
costs through surcharges unacceptably allocates financial risk to
105
ratepayers.
Similarly, agreements between utilities and contractors are
important risk allocators. Contractors may assume risk through firm
pricing agreements or pass on costs exclusively to the utility and its
ratepayers. For example, in the case of a proposed IGCC facility in
Minnesota, the Public Utility Commission found that:
Normally, independent power producers . . . offer power purchase
contracts under which they assume the risks of plant design and
construction. Here, the terms and conditions of the proposed contract
shift nearly all those risks to Xcel and its ratepayers, by requiring
payment of the full costs associated with engineering, procurement,
and plant construction. . . .
. . . [Though the newness of the technology complicates] setting a firm
power price . . . the proposed contract does not even provide second-

99. ICF Int’l, Investment Decisions for Baseload Power Plants I-12 (Jan. 29, 2010),
http://www.netl.doe.gov/energy-analyses/pubs/investmtdecsnsbsldpp4.pdf.
100. Id.
101. Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 262 U.S. 276, 276 n.1 (1923)
(explaining that the prudence standard excludes from rate base dishonest or obviously wasteful or
imprudent expenditures).
102. See ICF Int’l, supra note 99.
103. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-101 (2013); see also Fla. Stat. § 366.93 (2013).
104. Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n, Cause No. 43114, Duke Energy Ind., Inc., at 51 (Nov. 20, 2007)
(final order).
105. See Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., Order No. 83410, Case No. 9208, Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., at
7–8 (June 21, 2010) (“[W]e conclude that BGE ratepayers should not exclusively shoulder the burden
in the event that costs associated with the Proposal are greater than expected, or that anticipated
benefits do not materialize.”); Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. E-6472/M-05-1993, Excelsior
Energy, Inc., at 19 (Aug. 30, 2007).
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best protections, such as price ceilings, competitive bidding, or
106
regularly scheduled prudence-review conferences.

PUCs can and do accept increased cost and risk in order to
accomplish other state policy goals, such as development of in-state energy
107
resources and generation diversity. However, specific energy policy
goals articulated by state legislatures have played a critical role in
facilitating PUC approval of a handful of innovative energy generation
108
projects in recent years. Although PUCs have frequently considered
economic development, environmental, and other broad benefits of
innovative generation technologies, these factors alone have so far
proven insufficient to outweigh the inherent cost and risk associated with
109
demonstration projects.
The number of utility proposals to demonstrate or deploy innovative
technologies in recent years is small compared to the momentous need for
innovation in the electricity sector to meet climate mitigation and national
security goals. One likely reason that relatively few projects have
advanced to the stage of PUC approval (or disapproval) is reluctance on
the part of regulated utilities to invest time and resources into projects
110
that PUCs are unlikely to approve. Utility proposals to invest in mature
renewable energy resources have faced similar state regulatory hurdles,
111
further illustrating the challenge of implementing nascent technology.
To explore the intersection of energy innovation goals and state
PUCs in detail, this Article draws on eleven recent PUC cases with well-

106. Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n at 19.
107. See infra Part III.A.4. (describing the importance of Mississippi’s Baseload Act, and West
Virginia and Indiana’s preference for clean coal technology in their state PUCs’ respective decisions to
approve IGCC plants).
108. See infra Part III.A.4.
109. See infra Part III.A.4.
110. One analysis of the effect of regulation on utility innovation behavior posits that utilities
today are more risk averse and less likely to innovate because during the 1970s many utilities
abandoned construction of nuclear power plants and public utility commissions frequently denied cost
recovery of imprudent expenses. See Nat’l Regulatory Research Inst., Regulatory Practices and
Innovative Generation Technologies: Problems and New Rate-making Approaches 64 (1994).
Utilities and merchant developers have also noted the difficulty of moving forward with innovative
generation projects as regulated entities. See, e.g., AEP Places Carbon Capture Commercialization On
Hold, Citing Uncertain Status Of Climate Policy, Weak Economy, Am. Elec. Power (July 14, 2011),
http://www.aep.com/newsroom/newsreleases/Default.aspx?id=1704 (quoting Chairman and CEO
Michael G. Morris’s statement that, “as a regulated utility it is impossible to gain regulatory approval
to recover our share of the costs . . . without federal requirements . . . already in place”); Glenn
Adams, Maine Offshore Wind Project Gets Key Approval, Associated Press (Jan. 24, 2013),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/maine-offshore-wind-project-gets-key-approval (“The PUC vote was the
biggest hurdle the Hywind Maine project faced.”).
111. See, e.g., Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 2009-00545, Ky. Power Co., at 8 (June 28, 2010)
(denying Kentucky Power Company’s proposal to enter into a long-term power purchase agreement
for wind energy); Ohio Pub. Util. Comm’n, Case Nos. 10-501-EL-FOR, 10-502-EL-FOR, Ohio Power
Co., at 25–28 (Jan. 9, 2013) (opinion & order) (denying AEP-Ohio’s proposal to build an
approximately fifty megawatt (“MW”) solar energy farm).
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developed records in which utilities sought approval of large-scale
demonstration projects. These cases include five applications to construct
or purchase power from proposed IGCC coal facilities with and without
112
CCS, two applications to recover the cost of demonstrating CCS
113
technology on an existing coal-fired power plant, and four applications
to enter into long-term contracts to purchase power from proposed
114
offshore wind farms. The Authors have identified additional examples
of recent utility proposals to implement innovative generation
115
116
technologies (biomass gasification, grid-scale electricity storage, solar117
118
119
coal hybrid generation, solar-to-battery, space-based photovoltaic,
120
ocean energy ), but those cases have involved smaller scale
demonstrations or limited documentation of the PUC decision process.
A. Other Factors PUCs Consider When Evaluating Demonstration
Projects
A review of recent well-documented PUC decisions regarding utility
proposals to demonstrate or deploy innovative technologies reveals three
factors that regulators have deemed important, in addition to the central
goal of minimizing cost, including hedging value, fuel diversity, and local
economic competitiveness. This Subpart describes each factor and
discusses the critical role of state legislation in establishing explicit energy
policy goals guiding state regulatory approval of innovative generation
technologies.

112. See generally Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n, Cause No. 43114, Duke Energy Ind., Inc. (Nov. 20,
2007); Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. E-6472/M-05-1993, Excelsior Energy, Inc. (Aug. 30,
2007); Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co. (Apr. 24, 2012); W. Va.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co. (Mar. 6, 2008) (order);
Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co. (Apr. 14, 2008).
113. See generally Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUE-2009-00030, Appalachian Power Co.
(July 15, 2009); W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 10-0699-E-42T, Appalachian Power Co.
(Mar. 30, 2011) (order on the application for a rate increase).
114. Me. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 2010-00235, Order Approving Term Sheet (Feb. 26,
2013); Mass. Dep’t Pub. Util., D.P.U. 10-54, 48–51, Mass. Elec. Co. & Nantucket Elec. Co.
(Nov. 22, 2010); R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4111, Review of Proposed Town of New
Shoreham Project (Apr. 2, 2010).
115. Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 4220-CE-169, Northern State Power Co.—Wis. (Dec. 22,
2009) (final decision).
116. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 11-035-140, Rocky Mountain Power (Nov. 22, 2011)
(report & order).
117. Colo. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Decision No. C09-0472, Docket No. 09A-15E, Pub. Serv. Co. of
Colo. (Apr. 27, 2009).
118. Colo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Decision No. C12-0026, Docket No. 11A-713E, Pub. Serv. Co. of
Colo. (Jan. 11, 2012) (decision granting application for rehearing, reargument, and reconsideration).
119. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. AL-3690-E/NB2, Resolution E-4380, Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. (Dec. 16, 2010).
120. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. AL-3181-E, Resolution E-4196, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.
(Oct. 16, 2008).
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1. Hedging Value
PUCs have recognized the potential for new technologies to hedge
121
against risk. For example, regulations governing emissions of hazardous
air pollutants and interstate transport of air emissions have increased the
122
cost of generating electricity from coal in recent years. Future climate
policy could dramatically alter the economics of conventional fossil-fuel
technologies and newer low-carbon options, such as renewables and
123
advanced fossil generation with CCS. Other forthcoming environmental
124
rules, such as coal ash for coal-fired power plants have the potential to
influence relative costs. Inclusion of alternative technologies in a utility’s
generation portfolio reduces utility and ratepayer exposure to these
125
environmental regulatory risks. Experience with construction and
operation of certain technologies, such as CCS, could also prove valuable
under future climate policy.
2. Fuel Diversity
Similar to the hedging value described above, PUCs have recognized
the inherent value of diversity in a utility’s generation portfolio, thereby
limiting exposure to a host of risks associated with specific generation
technologies. For example, a portfolio comprised overwhelmingly of coal
or natural gas generation is more vulnerable to changes in fuel prices
than a portfolio that includes a mix of coal, natural gas, nuclear, and
126
renewables. This was an important factor in the Mississippi Public
Service Commission’s (“MPSC”) decision to allow Mississippi Power
Company to proceed with an IGCC coal-fired power plant that will
127
capture and sixty-five percent of its CO2 emissions. At the time of the
MPSC’s decision, Mississippi Power already generated more than fifty
128
percent of its electricity from natural gas.

121. See, e.g., W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co., at 70
(Mar. 6, 2008); Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n, Cause No. 43114, Duke Energy Ind., Inc., at 42–43 (Nov. 20, 2007).
122. See generally Pratson et al., supra note 8.
123. See ICF Int’l, supra note 99, at I-3.
124. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 35128
(June 21, 2010) (to be codified at scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.).
125. For example, the West Virginia Public Service Commission (“PSC”) found that the cost of an
IGCC plant is nine percent cheaper than a pulverized coal plant if considering the expected cost of future
environmental regulations. W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power
Co., at 72 (Mar. 6, 2008).
126. Patrick Bean & David Hoppock, Least-Risk Planning for Electric Utilities (Nicholas Inst. for
Envtl. Pol’y Solutions, Working Paper No. 13-05.).
127. See generally Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co. (Apr. 24,
2012).
128. Id. at 30, 32, 82.
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3. Local Economic Competitiveness
PUCs commonly consider economic development concerns when
weighing utility proposals. For example, the number of jobs created or
destroyed when a new power plant is proposed or an old plant retires
often factors into PUC decisions. Likewise, PUCs have considered direct
and indirect local economic development opportunities when evaluating
proposals to implement innovative technologies. For example, PUCs
have recognized the potential for technology to attract new industries to
129
130
the state, develop under-utilized natural resources, or provide a new
131
market for existing industries as benefits.
4. Explicit State Policy Goals
Although PUCs have commonly recognized the benefits of
innovative energy generation projects described above, state legislation
that explicitly identifies one or more factors as a public interest goal has
factored heavily into PUC decisions to approve a limited number of
132
innovative generation projects. For example, PUCs have recognized as
benefits the potential for technology to attract new industries to the
state, develop under-utilized natural resources, or provide a new market
133
for existing industries. Virginia, which has no similar preference,
rejected the same IGCC project that West Virginia approved on account
134
of high cost and risk to ratepayers. Similarly, the 2008 Mississippi
Baseload Act declares construction of diverse, baseload power plants to
be in the public interest and directs the PUC to consider advanced
135
technologies such as for coal and nuclear. The Baseload Act was a key
factor in the MPSC decision to approve the IGCC coal plant referenced
136
above. Similar deference to explicit state policy goals has aided PUC

129. See, e.g., Me. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 2010-00235, Order Approving Term Sheet, at
14 (Feb. 26, 2013) (“[T]here is an unquantifiable, but nevertheless important, economic value
associated with establishing Maine on the forefront of offshore wind development. This Project is the
kind of investment contemplated by the Ocean Energy Act as the foundation for building a strong
offshore wind industry in Maine.”).
130. See generally Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co. (Apr. 24,
2012).
131. See generally Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n, Cause No. 43114, Duke Energy Ind., Inc. (Nov. 20,
2007); see also W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co., at 2, 70
(Mar. 6, 2008).
132. See, e.g., R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4111, Review of Proposed Town of New
Shoreham Project, at 78 (Apr. 2, 2010).
133. See generally Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n, Cause No. 43114; see also W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co., at 2, 70 (Mar. 6, 2008).
134. Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co., at 8 (Apr. 14,
2008).
135. Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-101 (2013).
136. See generally Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co. (Apr. 24,
2012).
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approval of a handful of offshore wind projects on the eastern
137
seaboard.
A state policy preference for implementation of new technology has
not always been sufficient to move demonstration projects forward,
138
however. The following Part describes four PUC inquiries into whether
proposed innovative generation projects satisfy the public interest,
including the weight PUCs afforded to the benefits described above and
the role of specific state policy goals in each PUC’s decision process.

IV. Case Studies: PUC Decisions Regarding Innovative Electric
Power Technologies
Recent PUC decisions from West Virginia, Virginia, Mississippi,
and Rhode Island highlight the intersection between electric power
technology innovation and the state PUC process. The case studies below
describe federal programs that are dedicated to developing new electricity
generation technologies, and PUC treatment of utility proposals to
construct demonstration projects or enter into long-term power purchase
agreements to purchase electricity produced by advanced technologies that
are not currently deployed in the United States.
A. Carbon Capture and Sequestration
CCS is a three-step process that consists of: (1) capture and
compression of CO2 that is released as a byproduct of fossil fuel
combustion or industrial processes; (2) transportation of the CO2 to a
long-term storage site, typically via pipeline; and (3) storage of the CO2
139
in geologic formations to prevent its release into the atmosphere. With
CCS, the power sector could reduce CO2 emissions dramatically while
continuing to rely on fossil fuels for electricity generation.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration’s International Energy
Outlook 2013 reference case projects that coal will comprise a major
140
portion of national and global electricity generation through 2040.
Global demand for coal is projected to increase for the foreseeable
141
future absent significant policy intervention, and coal will continue to
provide a major portion of U.S. electricity generation despite projections
137. See generally Mary Ann Christopher & Tom Mullooly, Early Offshore Wind PPAs Have
Influential Supporters, N. Am. Wind Power, Oct. 2010; see also Me. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket
No. 2010-00235, Order Approving Term Sheet, at 14 (Feb. 26, 2013).
138. See, e.g., Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. E-6472/M-05-1993, Excelsior Energy, Inc.
(Aug. 30, 2007); R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4111, Review of Proposed Town of New
Shoreham Project (Apr. 2, 2010).
139. See Carbon Capture and Storage, supra note 4, at 2.
140. International Energy Outlook 2013: Interactive Table Browser, World Installed Coal-fired
Generating Capacity by Region and Country, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/
tablebrowser/#release=IEO2013 (last visited June 1, 2014).
141. Id.
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that the nation’s electricity sector will build few additional coal-fired
142
power plants. Given these trends, the International Energy Agency
describes CCS as critical to attainment of global climate mitigation
143
goals. Though the recent boom in natural gas production contributed
144
to a decline in CO2 emissions from the U.S. electricity sector, energy
modeling indicates that CCS will also be needed to control emissions
from natural gas power plants in order to achieve significant global
145
reductions in CO2 emissions.
1. Federal Support for CCS
146

The DOE has pursued CCS research and development since 1997,
but launched its efforts in earnest after the Energy Policy Act of 2005
147
provided a ten-year framework and authorization for CCS RD&D. The
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 further provided for
148
seven large-scale CCS demonstration projects. With the American
149
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Congress appropriated an
150
additional $3.4 billion for CCS RD&D. In February 2010, President
Obama established the Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and
Storage and set a goal of bringing five to ten commercial demonstration
151
projects online by 2016. The Task Force has described the focus of CCS
RD&D efforts as twofold: (1) to demonstrate the operation of current
CCS technologies integrated at an appropriate scale; and (2) to improve
CCS technologies and advanced generation technologies such as
gasification that, together, will facilitate widespread cost-effective
152
deployment.
Although technology exists at all three steps of the CCS process,
current methods are very expensive as applied to the power sector and
must be integrated with power plant design at scale. For example, CO2
capture from industrial gas streams dates to the 1930s, but existing
capture technology is energy intensive and would reduce electricity

142. Id.
143. Int’l Energy Agency, Technology Roadmap: Carbon Capture and Storage 1 (2013).
144. Energy-Related CO2 Emissions, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/early_carbonemiss.cfm.
145. Int’l Energy Agency, supra note 143, at 15.
146. See Folger, supra note 4, at 1.
147. Id. at 4 (citing Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 963, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(119 Stat.) 594, 891–92).
148. Id. (citing Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140,
2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. (121 Stat.) 1492, 1704–16).
149. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(123 Stat.) 115, 139.
150. FE Implementation of the Recovery Act, Office of Fossil Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy,
http://energy.gov/fe/fe-implementation-recovery-act (last visited June 1, 2014).
151. Presidential Document, 75 Fed. Reg. 6087, 6087 (Feb. 5, 2010).
152. Carbon Capture and Storage, supra note 4, at 3.
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153

output and increase electricity rates.
The DOE estimates that
application of current technology to a supercritical coal-fired power plant
154
would increase the cost of electricity by eighty percent. Capture of CO2
contributes approximately seventy to ninety percent of the cost, and as a
result, the DOE has focused on RD&D to lower the cost of capture in
addition to integration and demonstration of existing technologies at
155
scale. The DOE’s portfolio also includes development of advanced
generation technologies that simplify the process of separating CO2, such
156
as gasification. Today, the DOE is pursuing rapid commercialization of
157
cost-effective CCS technologies, which will require state regulatory
approval of an increasing number of demonstration projects.
2. The Mountaineer IGCC Project—West Virginia and Virginia
In 2007, Appalachian Power Company (APCo), a subsidiary of
American Electric Power Company, applied to the West Virginia and
Virginia PUCs for approval of a 629 MW “carbon capture ready” IGCC
158
coal facility in Mason County, West Virginia. At an estimated cost of
$2.23 billion, the project would cost twenty to thirty percent more than a
159
similar size pulverized coal facility. APCo planned to pursue federal
160
tax credits and additional state incentives to offset the cost and argued
that the value of IGCC technology is its potential to cost-effectively
161
capture CO2 emissions. Though West Virginia regulators approved the
project, the Virginia State Corporation Commission (“SCC”) denied
162
APCo’s bid for approval, preventing the project from moving forward.
This project—and a similar effort by APCo to recover costs of a
CCS demonstration project on the existing Mountaineer coal-fired power
plant described below—provides a particularly useful case study for two
reasons. First, because APCo serves customers in both states, this example
highlights the disparate reactions of two state PUCs that evaluated the
same set of facts surrounding a single proposed demonstration project.
Second, this example serves to illustrate the added complexity of

153. Id. at 2.
154. U.S. Dep’t of Energy & Nat’l Energy Tech. Lab., DOE/NETL Carbon Dioxide Capture
and Storage RD&D Roadmap 3 (2010).
155. Carbon Capture and Storage, supra note 4, at 3.
156. Capture and Storage RD&D Roadmap, supra note 154, at 12–13.
157. Id. at 3.
158. Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co., at 1 (Apr. 14,
2008).
159. Id.
160. W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co., at 65–66
(Mar. 6, 2008).
161. Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co., at 13
(Apr. 14, 2008).
162. Id. at 2.

June 2014]

COMPLETING THE ENERGY INNOVATION CYCLE

1371

demonstration projects that require approval from multiple state PUCs
because many utilities operate across state lines.
a. West Virginia PSC Evaluation
The West Virginia PSC approved APCo’s application on March 6,
163
2008, though not without concern. The PSC began its evaluation of the
project by stating four broad concerns regarding cost and risk: (1) even if
the project were completed under budget, it would be the single most
expensive project ever considered by the commission; (2) the direction of
federal climate policy is uncertain, and a primary benefit of the project is
its potential to cost effectively meet these unknown future standards;
(3) the special ratemaking treatment requested by APCo—which would
allow recovery of costs during construction—places an early and
substantial burden on the consuming public; and (4) IGCC and CCS
technologies are relatively new and therefore inherently risky. However,
the PSC reasoned, a host of other factors tipped the scale in favor of
approval, including the fact that “specific statutory provisions relating to
the Commission, direct[] the Commission to ‘[e]ncourage the wellplanned development of utility resources in a manner consistent with
state needs and in ways consistent with the productive use of the State’s
164
energy resources, such as coal.’”
While West Virginia’s stated preference for utility resources that
support an ongoing market for the state’s natural resources—a local
economic development concern—was a key factor in the PSC’s decision,
the commission also recognized the project’s value as a hedge against
165
future environmental regulations.
b. Virginia SCC Evaluation
On April 14, 2008, the Virginia SCC evaluated the same set of facts
and came to the contrary conclusion that “it is neither reasonable nor
166
prudent for APCo to construct the proposed IGCC Plant.” As with the
West Virginia PSC, the SCC began with an inquiry into the project’s cost
and risk. First, the SCC found that the company’s cost estimate was not
167
credible. In particular, the SCC noted the absence of a fixed price
168
contract and meaningful price or performance guarantees. The SCC
further expressed concern regarding the company’s own doubts as to
whether it could obtain firm pricing without paying an “exorbitant risk

163. W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n at 2.
164. Id. at 2 (citing W. Va. Code § 24-1-1 (2008)).
165. Id. at 70, 72.
166. Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co., at 2–3
(Apr. 14, 2008).
167. Id. at 5.
168. Id.
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premium” given the complexity and duration of the project. In
addition, the SCC noted that uncertainty in the cost estimate is
170
compounded by the question of whether IGCC is a mature technology.
While West Virginia regulators described IGCC as a mature but
171
relatively new technology, the SCC questioned the maturity of the
172
technology at scale and the expected capacity factor of the plant.
With regard to the value of hedging against future environmental
compliance costs—which the West Virginia commission recognized as
potentially significant—the Virginia SCC dismissed any potential
benefits as uncertain. The SCC stressed that the addition of CCS would
add hundreds of millions of dollars to the total cost and would be driven
173
by climate policy “that is yet to come.” The SCC further reasoned that
uncertainty surrounding the technology, cost, and future policy rendered
174
it impossible to assess the potential CO2 benefits of the proposed plant.
3. The Mountaineer CCS Demonstration Project—West Virginia
and Virginia
Undeterred by the 2008 failure to gain approval for the IGCC
facility, APCo sought approval from West Virginia and Virginia
regulators in 2009 to include in electricity rates the cost already incurred
during phase I of a CCS demonstration project at the existing
Mountaineer pulverized coal-fired power plant in Mason County, West
Virginia. APCo’s parent company, AEP, launched the demonstration
project in partnership with Alstom, RWE, the National Energy
175
Technology Laboratory, and the Battelle Memorial Institute. The
phase I pilot project operated between twelve and eighteen months,
176
capturing CO2 from a thirty MW side slip, and was the first CCS
177
demonstration project on an in-service coal plant. Phase II would have
entailed a commercial-scale demonstration of carbon capture, with the
DOE providing a grant for fifty percent of the project costs ($334

169. Id. at 5–6.
170. Id. at 11.
171. W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co., at 70 (Mar. 6,
2008).
172. Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co., at 11–12
(Apr. 14, 2008).
173. Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted).
174. Id. at 7–9.
175. AEP Mountaineer Fact Sheet: Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Project, Carbon Capture
&
Sequestration
Tech.
Program,
Mass.
Inst.
of
Tech.
(Jan. 30,
2014),
http://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/aep_alstom_mountaineer.html.
176. Id.
177. W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co., at 19 (Mar. 6,
2008).
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million), but AEP cancelled the project citing the difficulty of recovering
178
project costs as a regulated utility, among other challenges.
a. West Virginia Evaluation
Here, the West Virginia PSC acknowledged the broad societal
benefits of testing CCS technology but was “troubled” by the cost recovery
179
request for a number of reasons. First, when the PSC approved the
IGCC project described above, it specifically held that retrofitting with
180
CCS would constitute a major modification and require a CPCN. In the
present case, APCo did not file for a CPCN for CCS demonstration
181
project. Though phase I consisted of a small-scale pilot project, the
182
cost—$30.9 million—was nontrivial.
Further, the West Virginia PSC articulated a broader responsibility
for sharing the cost of demonstration projects with diffuse benefits,
stating, “We believe that this operating cost also needs to be shared
183
among all AEP operating facilities.” Accordingly, the PSC allowed a
184
portion of the cost commensurate with APCo’s share of AEP load. The
PSC acknowledged its lack of authority to allocate the remaining cost to
other AEP jurisdictions, but stated that AEP companies and state
185
regulatory commissions can and should cooperate.
b. Virginia Evaluation
In response to APCo’s request to recover a portion of the CCS
demonstration project costs through its rates, the Virginia SCC again
articulated the difficulty of asking ratepayers to shoulder the cost of
demonstration projects with diffuse societal benefits. Here, the
commission stated:
It is reasonable for AEP to evaluate and explore options regarding
potential federal legislation or regulation regarding GHG emissions.
We do not find, however, that it was reasonable for APCo to incur the
Mountaineer CCS project costs and then seek recovery from Virginia
ratepayers. . . . [A]lthough AEP asserts that this demonstration project
will benefit customers of all of AEP’s operating companies and of all

178. Am. Elec. Power, supra note 110 (quoting Chairman and CEO’s statement that, “as a
regulated utility, it is impossible to gain regulatory approval to recover our share of the costs . . .
without federal requirements . . . already in place”).
179. W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, at 47.
180. Id. at 79.
181. Id. at 45.
182. Id. at 45.
183. Id. at 47.
184. Id. at 47–48.
185. Id. at 48.
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utilities in the United States, APCo’s ratepayers (not shareholders) are
186
being asked to pay for all of the costs incurred by this project.

In contrast to West Virginia’s solution of allowing recovery for only a fair
share of the demonstration project costs, the Virginia SCC denied the
187
entire request.
4. The Kemper County IGCC Project—Mississippi
At the time of writing, Mississippi Power Company, a subsidiary of
Southern Company, is constructing a 582 MW IGCC power plant in
188
Kemper County Mississippi, known as Plant Ratcliffe. Plant Ratcliffe
will burn locally mined lignite coal and capture sixty-five percent of its
189
CO2 emissions for enhanced oil recovery. The plant has an expected
190
operation date of 2015. Plant Ratcliffe was one of two projects selected
to receive a federal loan guarantee under round two of the DOE’s Clean
Coal Power Initiative but has since withdrawn its application, stating that
191
the company can obtain lower cost financing elsewhere.
Plant Ratcliffe is the only advanced coal plant with CCS that is
192
under construction in the United States. Though the Mississippi PSC
193
approved the project in May 2010, state regulatory approval has
presented an ongoing challenge. The Mississippi commission denied the
194
company’s initial bid to construct Plant Ratcliffe on April 29, 2010. At
that time, the PSC held that, as proposed, the benefits would not outweigh
195
the costs and risks borne by ratepayers. It also found, however, the
196
project could in concept benefit ratepayers. The PSC invited Mississippi
186. Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUE-2009-00030, Appalachian Power Co., at 20
(July 15, 2010) (final order) (emphasis added).
187. Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co., at 2 (Apr. 14,
2008).
188. Kemper County IGCC Fact Sheet: Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Project, Carbon
Capture & Sequestration Tech. Program, Mass. Inst. of Tech. (Dec. 13, 2013),
http://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/kemper.html.
189. See id.; see also Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co., at 6,
89, 91 (Apr. 24, 2012).
190. Eileen O’Grady, Southern Co Delays Advanced Coal Plant to 2015 Amid Rising Costs,
Reuters (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/29/utilities-southern-kemperidUSL2N0NL2K220140429.
191. Id.
192. The Texas Clean Energy Project, Hydrogen Energy California, and FutureGen 2.0 are in the
planning stages and considered active CCS demonstration projects. See The United States CCS
Financing Overview, Carbon Capture & Sequestration Tech. Program, Mass. Inst. of Tech.
(Dec. 20, 2013), http://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/us_ccs_background.html. In addition, Duke
Energy is constructing a “CCS-ready” IGCC coal plant in Edwardsport, Indiana, but has no current
plan to install CCS. See Edwardsport Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) Station, Duke
Energy, http://www.duke-energy.com/pdfs/igcc-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited June 1, 2014).
193. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-14, Miss. Power Co. (Apr. 29, 2010).
194. Id. at 49.
195. Id. at 2.
196. Id.

June 2014]

COMPLETING THE ENERGY INNOVATION CYCLE

1375

Power Company to submit an alternative proposal that equitably
197
distributes the project’s uncertainties and risks. Approximately one
month later, the PSC approved the company’s amended proposal in a
198
two-to-one vote. In February 2011, the Mississippi Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the Commission’s order on appeal, holding that
the PSC had not supported its decision to approve the facility with
199
substantial evidence. In another two-to-one vote, the PSC affirmed its
decision to approve the plant on April 24, 2012, drawing on the existing
200
record to substantiate its decision.
In contrast to the West Virginia and Virginia commissions, the
Mississippi PSC began its initial evaluation of the IGCC project proposal
201
with a discussion of its benefits. First, the PSC found that the project
202
would meet an existing need for stable, baseload energy. Here, the PSC
203
which
relied upon the state’s recently enacted Baseload Act,
establishes a preference for diverse baseload generation, in its decision to
204
impart particular importance on this feature. Notably, the Baseload
Act declares “that the State should take advantage of advances in
nuclear, coal and other technologies, including technologies that reduce
or minimize, or that facilitate the future reduction or minimization of,
205
regulated air emissions.”
Next, the PSC assigned significant weight to the project’s contribution
to fuel diversity, noting that Mississippi Power’s generation portfolio was
already more than fifty percent natural gas and would reach seventy
percent if the company relied on natural gas to meet its need rather than
206
the proposed IGCC facility. Plant Ratcliffe will burn lignite—a lowerranked and lower-priced coal—that is mined locally with minimal
207
transportation cost.
In addition, the PSC noted that the proposed plant would ensure
compliance with existing environmental laws and regulations and
208
mitigate risk of future climate change legislation. Beyond the ratepayer
benefits of environmental compliance, the PSC found that the project
would contribute to clean coal and enhanced oil recovery technology and
thereby contribute to national energy security and efforts to mitigate

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 2–3.
Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-14, Miss. Power Co., at 25 (May 26, 2010).
Sierra Club v. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 82 So. 3d 618, 618 (Miss. 2012).
Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co., at 132 (Apr. 24, 2012).
Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-14, Miss. Power Co., at 2 (Apr. 29, 2010).
Id. at 6.
Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-101 (2008).
Id.
Id. § 77-3-101(c).
Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co., at 30, 32, 82 (Apr. 24, 2012).
Id. at 89.
Id. at 91.

1376

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
209

[Vol. 65:1345

climate change. While the broad national benefits of Plant Ratcliffe
would accrue beyond Mississippi Power’s ratepayers, the PSC
acknowledged a number of government grants, tax incentives, and loan
210
programs that would defray a portion of the costs.
Finally, the PSC pointed to state and local economic development
opportunities that would flow from Plant Ratcliffe. For example, the
project would directly create temporary jobs to construct the IGCC plant
and nearby lignite mine, create permanent jobs at the power and mine
211
facilities, and increase mineral royalties and state and local tax revenues.
In addition, Plant Ratcliffe would provide a catalyst to expand lignite
business opportunities, which represent a large and relatively untapped
Mississippi natural resource, and foster enhanced oil recovery projects
212
within the state.
However, the PSC also identified and expressed concern regarding a
number of risks associated with Plant Ratcliffe, including risks associated
with construction of any baseload facility and implementation of a new
213
technology. For example, like all large electric utility capital investments,
214
Plant Ratcliffe bears capital cost risk and project cancellation risk. In
addition, the project carries performance risk, first of a kind technology
risk, potential loss of federal incentives, and risk that expected
supplemental revenue streams—CO2, ammonia, and sulfuric acid
byproducts, which the company intends to sell to offset ratepayer costs—
215
never materialize.
Several measures to mitigate and allocate risk were critical to the
PSC’s approval, including: (1) allowance for recovery of only a fraction of
216
construction costs rather than the full costs incurred during construction;
(2) a cost cap of twenty percent ($2.88 billion) above the company’s
approved estimate, shifting risk to the utility for any construction cost
217
overruns beyond the cap; (3) performance parameters to assure that
218
ratepayers will not pay for an underperforming asset; and (4) a
requirement to periodically reevaluate the economics to mitigate risk
219
that a subsequent technology becomes a better option. Plant Ratcliffe
has since faced considerable construction cost overruns that have

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 92–93.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 92–93.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id. at 82, 85–86.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 9, 21.
Id. at 9.
Id.
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increased the facility’s estimated cost to approximately $5.5 billion,
220
nearly double the $2.88 billion cap.
B. Offshore Wind
Offshore winds are stronger and blow more consistently than winds
221
over land. The DOE estimates the nation’s offshore energy resource,
including the Great Lakes, is approximately four times the combined
222
generating capacity of all U.S. power plants. Offshore wind technology
has the potential to capture this abundant renewable energy resource,
contribute to greenhouse gas reduction and renewable energy goals, and
223
provide coastal populations with a local renewable energy option.
However, offshore wind faces a number of challenges to development
and deployment in the United States, including high cost relative to
224
alternative fossil fuel and renewable energy technologies, technical
challenges to installation and interconnection with the electricity grid,
225
and permitting challenges in federal and state waters. Europe has
successfully developed shallow water offshore wind technology, with
approximately 2000 MW installed capacity, but the European market is
226
heavily subsidized. A recent market analysis describes the U.S. offshore
wind industry as in a slow transition from early development to
227
commercial demonstration. In addition, accessing the abundant wind
resources located in deep waters off the coast of the United States will
228
require innovative wind turbine designs.
1. Federal Support for Offshore Wind
From 2006 to 2012, the DOE awarded more than $300 million to
229
offshore wind RD&D. The DOE is focused on reducing the cost of
offshore wind energy to accelerate development and deployment of
offshore wind in the United States through its Offshore Wind Innovation
230
and Demonstration initiative (“OSWInD”). The DOE estimates that a
fifty percent reduction in cost of energy projections is necessary to
achieve a scenario of fifty-four gigawatts of offshore wind deployed by

220. O’Grady, supra note 190.
221. Wind & Water Power Tech. Office, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Offshore Wind Projects 2006–
2012, at 2 (2012).
222. Id.
223. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, A National Offshore Wind Strategy: Creating an Offshore Wind
Industry in the United States 6–7 (2011).
224. See supra Part III.B. tbl. 1.
225. National Offshore Wind Strategy, supra note 223, at 2.
226. Id. at 5–6.
227. Navigant Consulting, Inc., Offshore Wind Market and Economic Analysis xv (2013).
228. Offshore Wind Projects 2006–2012, supra note 221, at 1.
229. Id. at 2.
230. National Offshore Wind Strategy, supra note 223, at 2.
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231

2030. In addition to reducing the costs of various components, start-up
and permitting processes, and grid interconnection, achieving a lower cost
of capital for offshore wind development requires demonstration and
232
validation of offshore wind technologies. In the short term, OSWInD is
focused on the initial deployment of offshore wind technology in U.S.
233
waters, such as the projects described in this Article that have come
before utility commissions in several eastern states. OSWInD’s longerterm research and development efforts seek to develop new cost234
competitive offshore wind technologies. The federal government also
remains focused on resolving federal and state permitting issues, related
to leasing of federal waters for wind farms and related transmission
235
infrastructure and environmental reviews.
2. The Block Island Offshore Wind Demonstration Project—Rhode
Island
In 2009, Rhode Island enacted a Long Term Contracting Standard for
Renewable Energy, which directed the state’s electric distribution
companies to annually solicit proposals from renewable energy developers
236
for long-term contacts subject to PUC approval. The Act directed the
Rhode Island PUC to approve such contracts if they are “commercially
237
defined as: “terms and pricing that are reasonably
reasonable,”
consistent with what an experienced power market analyst would expect
to see in transactions involving newly developed renewable energy
238
resources.” It also established that the public interest would be served
by a small-scale offshore wind demonstration project off the coast of
239
Block Island. The legislation also identified a number of benefits the
Block Island project would provide, including local economic development
benefits of becoming a forerunner in the nascent offshore wind industry,
and its contribution to energy independence and reduced reliance on fossil
240
fuels. Although Rhode Island is a restructured state, relying on a
competitive market for electricity generation as opposed to vertically
integrated utilities, the Rhode Island PUC has jurisdiction over longterm power purchase agreements between regulated distribution utilities

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at iii, 9.
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 14.
Id.
See id. at 10–13.
R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 39-26.1-3(a)–(b) (2010).
Id. § 39-26.1-3(b).
Id. § 39-26.1-2(1).
Id. § 39-26.1-7(a).
Id.
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241

and merchant developers. As noted earlier, merchant firms are free to
pursue generation projects without PUC approval, but implementation
of novel technologies typically requires developers to secure long-term
contracts to convince investors that there is a market for above-market
242
generation.
National Grid—the electric distribution company serving all but a
small corner of Rhode Island—solicited proposals and received a single
application from Deepwater Wind to construct an offshore wind
243
demonstration project off the coast of Block Island. The project would
244
consist of six wind turbines with a nameplate capacity of 21.6 MW. The
Rhode Island PUC rejected the proposed long-term contract, finding the
245
project commercially unreasonable. Two months after the PUC rejected
the proposed power purchase agreement, the general assembly amended
the definition of “commercially reasonable,” only as it applied to the Block
Island project, to “terms and pricing that are reasonably consistent with
what an experience power market analyst would expect to see for a project
246
of similar size, technology, and location.” The amendment also required
the Rhode Island PUC to expedite review of an amended power
purchase agreement and specified that the new contract must include a
mechanism whereby ratepayers receive the full benefit of any savings
247
relative to the estimated project costs. National Grid then reapplied to
the Rhode Island PUC with an amended proposal for a long-term power
purchase agreement for the Block Island project, and the Rhode Island
248
PUC approved the amended proposal two-to-one.
a. Rhode Island Initial Evaluation
The Rhode Island PUC based its initial decision to reject the Block
Island power purchase agreement solely on the above-market cost of
energy. Relying on the original definition of commercially reasonable,
the PUC concluded that the price (24.4 cents per kilowatt-hour (“kWh”),
escalating annually at 3.5 percent) was higher than an experienced power
market analyst would expect to see for transactions involving newly

241. See supra Part III.A (explaining the role of PUCs in restructured states in overseeing
innovative energy projects).
242. See supra Part III.A.
243. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4111, Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham
Project, at 3 (Apr. 2, 2010).
244. Id. at 4.
245. Id. at 68.
246. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-26.1-7(c)(iv) (2010) (emphasis added); see also In re Review of
Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 496 (R.I. 2011).
247. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 39-26.1-7(a)–(b), (e).
248. See generally R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4185, Proposed Town of New Shoreham
Project Pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-26.1-7 (Aug. 16, 2010).
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249

developed renewable energy resources. Notably, the Rhode Island
PUC further concluded that “[t]he pricing of the PPA must stand or fall
on its own,” excluding consideration of benefits such as economic
250
development.
Despite the Rhode Island PUC’s explicit exclusion of non-cost
project values, the PUC also determined that the record could not
support a finding that project benefits justify the $390 million in abovemarket costs, even if the commercially reasonable standard required
251
consideration of project benefits. Here, the Rhode Island PUC relied
on Deepwater Wind’s estimate of approximately $2.4 million in annual
252
direct economic benefits. The commission reasoned that any evidence
of “first-mover” benefits that may accrue from “getting something in the
water that permitting agencies and financial markets can understand and
accept” are not based on Rhode Island-specific studies, and therefore
253
cannot be quantified or seriously considered.
b. Rhode Island Round Two Evaluation
In the Rhode Island PUC’s subsequent decision to approve the
amended power purchase agreement, the commission began with a
recognition that it is “a creature of statute, and . . . possesses only those
powers, duties, and responsibilities conferred upon it by the General
254
Assembly.” The commission’s evaluation then recognized that the
General Assembly “substantially altered” the standard of review in this
case so as to “dramatically reduce[] the plenary discretion afforded to the
Commission” as it pertains to the commercial reasonableness of the
255
project. Applying the new definition of commercially reasonable—
requiring “terms and pricing that are reasonably consistent with what an
experienced power market analyst would expect to see for a project of
256
similar size, technology, and location,” —the Rhode Island PUC
considered the testimony of four expert witnesses, excluded consideration
of the cost of projects of different scale and projects that employ other
renewable energy technologies, and concluded that the project met the
257
new standard. However, the Commission also observed that the

249. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4111, Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham
Project, at 68 (Apr. 2, 2010).
250. Id. at 69.
251. Id. at 78.
252. Id. at 78–79.
253. Id. at 79–80.
254. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4185, Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project
Pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-26.1-7, at 129 (Aug. 16, 2010).
255. Id. at 129–30.
256. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-26.1-7(c)(iv) (2010) (emphasis added); see also In re: Review of
Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 496 (R.I. 2011).
257. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4185, at 130–36.
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General Assembly mandated the standard of review “[f]or purposes of
review of this one single PPA,” meaning that future proposals would have
258
to meet the original, more stringent, commercially reasonable standard.
C. Challenges to Technology Innovation in the State Regulatory
Process
The above case studies highlight several challenges to PUC approval
of utility-scale energy demonstration projects: high, uncertain costs;
uncertain economic benefits; interstate generation requiring approval
from multiple state PUCs; and diffuse societal benefits.
1. High, Uncertain Costs
Demonstration projects tend to be expensive compared to mature
generation projects, which have benefited from technological learning
and economies of scale. In addition, it is inherently difficult to estimate
construction and operating costs of projects that rely on new technologies.
As a result, it is difficult for PUCs—charged with ensuring that electricity
rates are just and reasonable—to allow ratepayers to accept the cost and
risk of demonstration projects.
Allowing ratepayers to fund certain types of demonstration projects
can be especially challenging because these projects are expensive
relative to other demonstration projects in the electricity sector. For
example, the nation’s largest smart grid demonstration project will cost
259
$178 million, shared between the DOE (fifty percent) and other project
participants, including eleven utilities, Bonneville Power Administration,
260
and private investors. One utility’s share of the cost—such as the
$2.1 million that Northwest Energy will invest—is a small fraction of the
261
costs of advanced coal demonstration projects described above. Even
the total project cost of $178 million is substantially lower than APCo’s
$334 million share of the CCS demonstration project proposed at the
Mountaineer coal-fired power plant. The Block Island offshore wind
demonstration project off the coast of Rhode Island is estimated to cost
262
ratepayers $370 million in above-market energy costs. The project
developer testified that a larger offshore wind farm could produce energy
at a lower price, but would be inadvisable to pursue until permitting

258. Id. at 132.
259. Carl Imhoff, Largest U.S. Smart Grid Demo is Set to Roll, IEEE: Smart Grid (June 2012),
http://smartgrid.ieee.org/june-2012/601-largest-u-s-smart-grid-demo-project-is-set-to-roll.
260. About
the
Project,
Pac.
Nw.
Smart
Grid
Demonstration
Project,
http://www.pnwsmartgrid.org/about.asp (last visited June 1, 2014).
261. Smart Grid, Nw. Energy, http://www.northwesternenergy.com/our-company/environmentalcommitment/smart-grid (last visited June 1, 2014).
262. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4185, at 103.
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authorities and financial markets become familiar with the technology
263
through smaller scale, but higher cost, demonstrations.
2. Uncertain Economic Benefits
Innovative low-carbon generation technologies have the potential to
provide direct benefits to ratepayers through reduced compliance costs if
and when the utility faces a policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Without a policy in place, however, the timing and magnitude of those
benefits are unknown, making it difficult for state utility regulators to
weigh the costs and benefits of proposed projects. For example, the
Virginia PUC, in its denial of a certificate of need for the Appalachian
Power Company’s proposed IGCC project, discounted any potential
264
climate policy compliance benefits due to policy uncertainty.
3. Challenges of Interstate Cooperation
Utility service areas frequently cross state boundaries, complicating
the task of securing regulatory approval for new investments. The
differential treatment of advanced coal projects in West Virginia and
Virginia illustrates the added risk for projects that require the approval of
multiple state PUCs. Further complicating the challenge of interstate
cooperation, certain economic benefits of demonstration projects—jobs,
economic development, potentially creating demand for coal—accrue
primarily to the state where the plant is located.
Although cooperation across multiple states is inherently more
difficult than individual state action, a group of states working together
would have significant advantages over individual state action. Sharing
costs and risks across multiple utilities in multiple states reduces rate
impacts and makes financing multiple, full-scale demonstration projects
feasible from a consumer protection perspective.
4. Diffuse Societal Benefits
In addition to any direct benefits to ratepayers from reduced future
compliance costs, demonstration projects provide learning benefits to the
265
U.S. economy, the electricity sector, and all electricity consumers.
Additional benefits to implementing utilities and their ratepayers—such
as the development of engineering protocols that improve reliability and

263. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4111, Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham
Project, at 83 (Apr. 2, 2010).
264. Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co., at 6–7
(Apr. 14, 2008).
265. See Sonia Yeh & Edward S. Rubin, A Review of Uncertainties in Technology Experience
Curves, 34 Energy Econ. 762 (2012).
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266

reduce the cost of future applications, or the attraction of a budding
267
industry to the state—are similarly long term and uncertain. It is
difficult, therefore, for a utility commission to ask one utility’s ratepayers,
or subset of ratepayers, to bear the cost and risk of a project with
widespread benefits. The diffuse benefits from technology development
may be larger than project benefits realized by ratepayers, especially for
small-scale demonstration projects with minor emissions reductions,
further discouraging commission approval of ratepayer support for these
types of projects.
With the exception of policies promoting renewable energy and
268
energy efficiency, utility regulation in the United States is generally not
designed to extend costs beyond a utility’s service area. As a result,
approving demonstration projects requires commissions to make the
difficult decision that ratepayers within a particular service area should
bear the cost and risk of a project with widespread benefits. Statutory
directives for utility regulators to encourage the continued use of coal
facilitated commission approval of advanced coal projects in Indiana and
269
West Virginia. Similarly, Mississippi commissioners approved an IGCC
project to balance the utility’s heavy reliance on natural gas, citing the
270
legislature’s directive to seek diverse, baseload energy resources.
However, construction cost overruns in Indiana and Mississippi, low
natural gas prices, climate policy uncertainty, and fewer federal dollars
suggest that these decisions will become even more difficult without
innovative strategies that protect ratepayers and provide for an equitable
distribution of costs and benefits.

V. Addressing State-Level Barriers to Electric Power
Technology Innovation
A. The Innovation Premium
Constructing new electricity generation facilities is inherently costly.
Even a natural gas-fired combined cycle power plant—currently boasting
266. See, e.g., Colo. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Decision No. C09-0472, Docket No. 09A-15E, Pub. Serv.
Co. of Colo., at 8 (Apr. 27, 2009).
267. See Me. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 2010-00235, Order Approving Term Sheet, at 10–11
(Feb. 26, 2013).
268. A major difference between advanced coal and renewable energy/energy efficiency is the size of
individual projects and their capital costs. Policies that spread the cost of energy efficiency/renewable
energy projects across all ratepayers tend to have relatively small impacts on rates. However, the theory
behind widely sharing the cost of renewable energy/energy efficiency projects, which create external
benefits such as improved air quality and technological advancement, is similar to the rationale for
sharing the costs of advanced coal projects. The goal of the policy tools proposed here is to similarly share
costs so that advanced coal projects have relatively small rate impacts.
269. See generally Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n, Cause No. 43114, Duke Energy Ind., Inc. (Nov. 20,
2007); W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co. (Mar. 6, 2008).
270. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-14, Miss. Power Co. (Apr. 29, 2010).
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the lowest total levelized cost of electricity among conventional
271
generation options—can cost well over $500 million to construct. When
a PUC considers a utility proposal to construct a new generation facility
or enter into a power purchase agreement, the commission typically asks
two questions: Does the utility need the additional generation or capacity
to meet demand? If so, is the proposed facility the best (least-cost)
272
alternative to meet that need? This inquiry conceives consumer benefit
as primarily the availability of electrons to reliably meet electricity
demand at the lowest reasonable rate. Utilities and other participants in
these proceedings may also introduce secondary considerations, such as
local economic development benefits of specific projects—the number of
273
jobs created, the estimated increase in state and local tax revenues.
As Part III of this Article explains, early applications of new
technology can carry significant additional costs and technology risks.
Whereas mature technologies have benefited from the learning process
and economies of scale, learning is a primary benefit of putting innovative
technologies into practice. Implementation of novel technology is also
inherently risky. The technology could fail, underperform, or cost
substantially more than expected. Furthermore, the benefits of innovative
generation projects include factors that are more difficult to quantify and
accrue well beyond a utility’s service area. For example, demonstration
projects create learning benefits that feed back into the innovation cycle
and contribute to improvements in cost and performance of later
274
applications of similar technology.
The difference between the cost and risks associated with a
conventional electricity generation technology and an innovative
275
demonstration project creates an innovation premium. PUCs have
recognized the broad social benefits of innovative generation projects
but the diffuse learning benefits of technology innovation often do not
outweigh the premium that ratepayers must pay to implement innovative
276
generation technologies. In this sense, the innovation premium is a

271. For example, Indianapolis Power and Light is constructing a 650 MW natural gas combined
cylce plant for $631 million. See PennEnergy Editorial Staff, IPL to Build a 650 Combined-Cycle Gas
Turbine Power Station, PennEnergy (May 1, 2013), www.pennenergy.com/articles/pennenergy/2013/
05/ipl-to-build-650-mw-combined-cycle-natural-gas -turbine-power-station.html.
272. See generally Jones, supra note 24 (explaining the mandate of the PUC to ensure reliable
electricity at a reasonable cost).
273. See, e.g., R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4185, Proposed Town of New Shoreham
Project Pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-26.1-7, at 63, 93, 114 (Aug. 16, 2010).
274. Kelly Sims Gallagher et al., The Energy Technology Innovation System, 37 Ann. Rev. Env’t
Resources 137, 140 (2012). The authors also replace the deployment phase with “market formation
and diffusion.” Id. fig. 1.
275. For example, the West Virginia public utility commissions noted that an IGCC coal plant is
estimated to cost twenty to thirty percent more than a pulverized coal plant. See W. Va. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co., at 72 (Mar. 6, 2008).
276. See supra Part IV.
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barrier to widespread demonstration and deployment of a host of
technologies needed to meet national energy goals. The remainder of
this Part outlines two possible solutions: (1) ensuring that ratepayers
capture more of the added benefits of innovation; and (2) allocating the
innovation premium more widely to reflect the widespread benefits of
innovation. The details and feasibility of these and other possible solutions
should be explored in future research.
B. Allocating the Innovation Premium: Aligning Costs and
Benefits of Innovative Electricity Generation Projects
Numerous options exist to address the premium associated with first
generation energy technologies. A direct strategy for addressing the
premium, for example, is to reduce the cost difference between
conventional technologies and new technologies, either by reducing the
cost of new technologies or increasing the cost of conventional
technologies. As described above, the federal government currently has
numerous programs aimed at reducing the cost of new energy
277
technologies. Federal programs, such as loan guarantees, can lower the
cost of capital by reducing investment risk, and tax incentives that provide
additional income for certain types of electricity generation can also
reduce the cost of a new technology. Market-based strategies, such as the
278
carbon markets in California and the Northeastern states and the EPA’s
279
Acid Rain Program create a price for emitting specific pollutants,
thereby raising the cost of operating facilities with high emissions (e.g.,
coal) and making zero emitting technologies, such as nuclear energy or
280
While these strategies may
renewable energy, more competitive.
mitigate the cost premium, technology risks could remain a concern.
This Subpart provides an overview of three additional strategies for
addressing the innovation premium. First, policymakers could ensure
that ratepayers capture a larger portion of the broad benefits that accrue
from demonstration and deployment of novel technologies. Second,
policymakers could spread the innovation premium over a larger populace
to reduce the per capita premium for ratepayers, commensurate with
widespread societal benefits. Third, multi-utility or multi-state innovative
277. See supra Part I.
278. See Cap-and-Trade Program, Ca. Envtl. Protection Agency Air Resources Board (May
21, 2014), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm; Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, http://www.rggi.org (last visited June 1, 2014).
279. See Acid Rain Program, Envtl. Protection Agency: Clean Air Markets (July 25, 2012),
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp.
280. Lori A. Bird et al., Implications of Carbon Cap-and-Trade for US Voluntary Renewable
Energy Markets, 36 Energy Pol’y 2063, 2064 (2008) (explaining that “[i]n general, renewable energy
will benefit from carbon cap-and-trade programs because compliance with the cap will increase the
costs of fossil fuel generation, which will improve the cost-effectiveness of renewables and may
provide an incentive to capped entities to use renewable energy to meet future load growth”).
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technology portfolio standards can spread the costs of a new facility
beyond a single utility’s ratepayers, while also providing market demand
for the technologies.
1. Capturing the Added Benefits of Innovation
While the traditional ratepayer benefit of utility investments consists
281
of reliable service at reasonable rates, utilities and PUCs can adopt
measures that help ratepayers capture a portion of the added benefits of
innovation, offsetting the innovation premium at least in part. For
example, technology development and operational knowledge gains are
key benefits of demonstration projects. Though it is impossible to
capture all of the learning benefits of an individual project, intellectual
property laws allow companies to capture a portion of these benefits
282
through patents. PUCs can require utilities to share monetized learning
benefits with ratepayers to ensure that these added benefits of innovation
are divided in accordance with the allocation of cost and risk. For example,
as part of a recent settlement agreement between the Mississippi Public
Service Commission and Mississippi Power Company, Mississippi Power
customers will receive ten percent of any royalty revenues from the
283
licensing of the Kemper plant gasification technology. The Colorado
PUC has established a similar requirement that utilities submit a plan to
allocate the intellectual property benefits along with demonstration project
284
proposals.
Demonstration projects also create benefits by reducing regulatory
risk for utilities and ratepayers. For example, advanced coal generation
technologies capture or facilitate capturing CO2 emissions and generally
have conventional pollutant emissions that are significantly lower than
285
traditional pulverized coal plants. In the future, these lower emissions
rates and potentially sequestered CO2 could create benefits for project
owners if federal emissions standards are tightened or if the cost of
emissions increases under a cap-and-trade or taxing mechanism. If
ratepayers are paying the innovation premium, ensuring that ratepayers
directly benefit from potential upsides should encourage willingness to
pay and project approval.
In traditionally regulated electricity markets, utilities typically pass
the costs—operating and capital—of environmental compliance to
281. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 66 (describing the consumer benefits of the regulatory compact).
282. Tanya Woker, Principles of Copyright in Intellectual Property Law: An Overview, 20 Critical
Arts: S. N. J. Cultural & Media Stud., no. 1, 2006, at 36.
283. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Civ. Action 2012-UR-01108, Mississippi Power Company v.
Mississippi Public Service Commission (Jan. 24, 2013) (settlement agreement).
284. Co. Pub. Util. Comm’n, No. 11A-713E 3, Approval of an Innovative Clean Tech. Project
Consisting of a Solar-to-Battery Demonstration Project at the Solar Tech. Acceleration Ctr. &
for an Order Authorizing Deferred Accounting of All Project Costs (Oct. 12, 2011).
285. Michael T. Burr, Battle Royal: Pulverized Coal vs. IGCC, 143 Pub. Util. Fort., Dec. 2005, at 32–35.
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286

ratepayers. Lower emissions should result in lower compliance costs for
ratepayers, but ratepayers may not capture all of these benefits depending
on rate structures and the frequency of rate cases. For example, if
ratepayers fund an advanced coal plant that sequesters CO2 and the
corresponding emissions reduction can later be sold, ratepayers who paid
extra for the project might not see lower rates because traditional
regulation may not include the sequestration profits in a future rate case.
PUC rate-setting mechanisms should ensure that ratepayers benefit from
potential sales of sequestered or reduced emissions in the future.
2. Aligning the Innovation Premium with the Widespread Benefits
of Innovation
In addition to recognizing and capturing more of the broad consumer
benefits of technology innovation, sharing the innovation premium more
widely can alleviate the burden for individual ratepayers and is
commensurate with the broad social benefits of technological innovation.
There are multiple options for sharing costs and risks, including strategies
that could be adopted by utilities, a single state, or groups of states. For
example, states could help align the innovation premium with the broad
social benefits of demonstration projects by establishing state funding
287
through tax incentives, system benefits charges, wire charges, or fees on
288
each megawatt hour of coal or fossil generation. These measures would
spread the innovation premium beyond a particular utility’s service area,
reducing the premium borne by consumers within the implementing
utility’s service territory. Allocating a portion of the innovation premium
to the state would mirror the distribution of certain economic development
benefits—such as by attracting a nascent industry and increased tax
revenues.
Notably, this is the rationale for federal incentive programs to
demonstrate and deploy innovative technologies. However, the examples
discussed in this Article demonstrate that federal incentives do not offset
the entire innovation premium, leaving a substantial portion of the
project’s cost and risk to be borne by ratepayers. State PUCs have come
down on both sides with regard to projects that have been—or have the
possibility of being—awarded federal funds to promote innovation.
While states could provide a source of funding that augments federal
incentives and is commensurate with the state economic development
benefits of innovative generation projects, state funds may be difficult to

286. See, e.g., Understanding Utility Rates, Ind. Office of the Consumer Council,
http://www.in.gov/oucc/2389.htm (last visited June 1, 2014).
287. See generally Nat'l Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative, Carbon Dioxide Enhanced Oil
Recovery: A Critical Domestic Energy, Economic, and Environmental Opportunity (2012).
288. Dalia Patino Echeverri et al., Res. for the Future, Flexible Mandates for Investment
in New Technology (2012).
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establish or insufficient to fully mitigate the innovation premium for
ratepayers. This Subpart describes two additional measures to further
distribute the innovation premium: joint ownership of demonstration
projects and multi-utility long-term contracting requirements.
3. Joint Ownership
It is not uncommon for utilities to share ownership of large
generation facilities through bilateral or multilateral agreements. Recent
289
examples include nuclear units under construction in South Carolina
290
and Georgia. Mississippi Power recently announced a sale of fifteen
percent of Plant Ratcliffe to South Mississippi Electric Power Association
(“SMEPA”), which provides electricity to eleven cooperatives in the
291
state. These ownership arrangements help utilities attain economies of
scale, spread risk, and reduce the impact on individual ratepayers.
Sharing ownership more widely and spreading costs across all or
most of the ratepayers in an individual state or group of states would
reduce the rate impacts of the innovation premium on a dollar-perkilowatt-hour (“$/kWh”) basis. For example, a $1 billion dollar
demonstration project with $100 million in annual incremental operating
292
costs paid for by a utility serving a population of 500,000 would
293
increase electricity prices by almost 3 cents/kWh, but sharing these
294
costs across a state with a population of 4 million would raise electricity
prices approximately 0.35 cents/kWh. Sharing costs across the top five
coal states would raise price less than 0.1 cents/kWh.
289. South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (“SCE&G”) is jointly developing two new nuclear
reactors in Jenkinsville, South Carolina. SCE&G will own fifty-five percent of the two units, and
Santee Cooper, an electric cooperative supply company, will own forty-five percent. In its order
granting a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (“CPCN”) for the units, the South
Carolina Public Service commission notes, “the construction of two units allows SCE&G to partner
with Santee Cooper, spreading risk in the project, and providing a benefit to the state’s electric
cooperatives and customers.” S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 2008-196-E, Order No. 2009-104(A), In re
Combined Application of S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. for a Certificate of Envtl. Compatability and Pub.
Convenience and Necessity and for a Base Load Review Order for the Construction and
Operation of a Nuclear Facility in Jenkinsville, S.C. 27 (Mar. 2, 2009).
290. Georgia Power is constructing two new nuclear units at Plant Vogtle. The company will own
45.7% of the facility. Oglethorpe Power Corporation (an electric supply cooperative), MEAG Power
(a consortium of public power systems), and Dalton Utilities (a municipal utility) will own 30%,
22.7%, and 1.6%, respectively. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 27800-U, Georgia Power’s Application
for the Certification of Units 3 and 4 at Plant Vogtle and Updated Integrated Resource Plan
6 (Aug. 1, 2008).
291. See SME to Buy Gas-Fired Batesville, Kemper IGCC Power Plant Assets, PennEnergy
(Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.pennenergy.com/index/power/display/9992743905/articles/pennenergy/
power/gas/2012/august/sme-to_buy_gas-fired.html.
292. In this illustrative example, we assume the utility serves industrial, commercial, and
residential customers. Based on per capita electricity sales to all customer classes in West Virginia in
2011, $1 billion capital costs are incremental capital costs relative to alternative generation options.
293. Assuming a pre-tax cost of capital of 12.7% and thirty-year amortization.
294. Same assumptions as above, but for a larger population.
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Table 2: Rate Impacts of $1 Billion Advanced Coal Demonstration Project
295
with $100 Million Incremental Operating Costs.
Cost Sharing Entity

$/kWh

Increase in 2011 West
Virginia Residential Rate

Individual utility serving 500,000 residents*
$0.027
Individual state with 4 million residents†
$0.003
Top 5 coal states by percent generation
$0.001
Top 10 coal states by percent generation
$0.0004
*Based on per capita electricity use in West Virginia in 2010.
†Assumes all generation consumed locally; no exports.
Data from EIA Electric Power Monthly 2/2012.

29%
4%
1%
0.4%

Utilities are free to form and propose joint demonstration projects
without state legislative action. Utility commissions cannot require
utilities to submit joint proposals for demonstration projects that share
costs across a large customer base, but they can express support for these
actions during regulatory proceedings or through public comments and
296
Utility
approve projects that meet their criteria for prudency.
commissioners can also use national (and regional) organizations, such as
the National Association of Regulated Utility Commissioners, to express
297
support for utility cooperation on demonstration projects.
Sharing costs across an entire state or multiple states would more
directly address the concern that benefits accrue more widely than costs,
but it would likely mean that some of the ratepayers paying for the
demonstration project would never “use” the generation because it is
outside of the local market or balancing area. This would represent a
meaningful change from traditional financing for nonrenewable
generation. However, Delaware provides a recent example wherein the
state determined that demonstration project costs should be distributed
among a distribution utility’s entire customer base—regardless of the
generation supplier—so that all customers would benefit from the
298
project.

295. Sarah K. Adair et al., Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Pol’y Solutions, The State Role in
Technology Innovation 11 (2013), available at http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/
publications/ni_wp_13-01.pdf.
296. For example, the Mississippi PSC outlined specific conditions under which it would consider
Mississippi Power Company’s proposed IGCC project to be in the public interest in an order denying a
CPCN under the company’s proposed terms. See Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-14,
Miss. Power Co. (Apr. 29, 2010).
297. The National Association of Regulated Utility Commissioners regularly passes resolutions
supporting various actions or explaining commissioner perspectives. See generally Resolutions, Nat’l
Assoc. of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs, http://www.naruc.org/Policy/resolutions.cfm (last visited
June 1, 2014).
298. Christopher & Mullooly, supra note 137.
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4. Portfolio Standards and Multi-Utility Long-Term Contracting
Requirements
A state or groups of states could establish a portfolio standard for
innovative energy generation, similar to the advanced coal portfolio
299
standard in Illinois. This would create a guaranteed market for abovemarket generation, with all ratepayers helping to pay for a portion of the
project cost. If the developer is a vertically integrated utility, its ratepayers
would pay the majority of the cost unless the price of portfolio credits rose
significantly because of supply shortfalls.
Alternatively, multi-utility long-term contracting requirements
could distribute the innovation premium to more closely match the broad
social benefits of demonstration projects. This would ensure a market for
the project developer while spreading the innovation premium across all
participating utilities (and ratepayers) in contrast to previous proposals—
such as Appalachian Power Company’s proposed IGCC and CCS
demonstration projects—which would have allocated costs across state
300
lines but to ratepayers of a single utility. This policy would work
similarly to Minnesota’s law, which grants Innovative Energy Projects the
301
right to a long-term power purchase agreement subject to PUC approval.
Instead of establishing the requirement that a single utility enter into a
power purchase agreement, however, states could require multiple utilities
to purchase a share of the generation. States and commissions could also
adopt clear standards for allocating the risk premium between project
developers and participating utilities.

Conclusion
To meet national and global climate mitigation goals, a host of
innovative low-carbon electricity generation technologies must be
developed and deployed at a rate that far exceeds the pace of innovation
and adoption today. The federal government has long supported
innovation in the energy sector to support economic growth, enhance
security, and reduce pollution, and technological solutions are a key to
302
President Obama’s climate change strategy. The President’s 2015 budget
includes $27.9 billion in discretionary funds for the DOE to “position the
United States to compete as a world leader in clean energy and advanced
manufacturing; enhance U.S. energy security; cut carbon pollution and
respond to and prepare for the threat of climate change; and modernize

299. Int’l Energy Agency, A Policy Strategy for Carbon Capture and Storage 23 (2012).
300. See supra Part IV.A.2–3.
301. See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 2015 (2014); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the
President, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2014 (2013).
302. 2015 Fiscal Year Budget, supra note 301, at 73.
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the nuclear weapons stockpile and infrastructure.” For these strategies
to succeed, however, project developers must demonstrate to state PUCs
that utility-scale demonstration projects satisfy their consumer protection
goals. States, state utility regulators, utilities, and merchant project
developers need strategies to allocate the costs, risks, and benefits of
demonstration projects equitably, limiting the cost and risk borne by
individual ratepayers to finance projects with widespread societal benefits.

303. Id. at 7.
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